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Abstract 
 
Can distance-related information asymmetries in credit markets be overcome with contract 
design and credit scoring models? To answer this question, we explore differences in foreign and 
domestic banks’ credit contract terms and pricing models. Using a sample of firms that borrow 
from both domestic and foreign banks in the same month, we show that foreign banks are more 
likely to demand collateral and grant shorter maturity loans than domestic banks. Foreign banks 
also base their pricing on internal credit ratings and collateral pledges, while domestic banks 
price according to the length, depth and breadth of their relationship with a firm. These findings 
confirm that foreign banks can overcome informational disadvantages using contract design and 
credit scoring models. However, we also show that there are limitations, with foreign banks 
facing higher default rates and lower returns on lending if not using collateral and short maturity 
as disciplining tools. 
 
JEL Classification: G21, G30 
Keywords: Bank Financing, Foreign Ownership, Lending Technologies, Loan Pricing 
 
 
                                                
♣ Cass Business School, City University London, and CEPR, Email: TBeck@city.ac.uk. We gratefully acknowledge 
comments by two anonymous referees, Allen Berger, Ricardo Correa, Hans Degryse, Manthos Delis, Mariassunta 
Giannetti, Michael Kötter, Lars Norden, Daniel Paravisini, Jose-Luis Peydro, Steven Ongena, Greg Udell, Sascha 
Steffen and seminar participants at Cass Business School, Chinese University of Hong Kong, European Investment 
Bank, Peking University, Tilburg University and Universidad Carlos III de Madrid and conference participants at the 
CEPR-ECB-IU-RoF Conference 2012 in Frankfurt, the Emerging Scholars Conference 2012 in London, MoFiR 
Workshop on Banking 2013 in Ancona and the FIRS 2013 in Dubrovnik. A special thanks goes to Tobias Berg, 
Sascha Steffen and Anthony Saunders for their help with the Dealscan analysis and Bernardus van Doornik for the 
analysis using Brazilian credit registry data. 
 
 2 
1. Introduction 
A burgeoning literature on financial intermediation studies the impact of distance-related information 
frictions between borrowers and lenders in credit markets. Distance—be it geographical, cultural, 
institutional, or organizational— can aggravate information asymmetries and change incentives in ways 
that may lead to worse credit outcomes. The large increase in foreign bank entry across the globe and 
especially in emerging markets is one such example. A view espoused by many scholars is that distance-
related information constraints prevent foreign banks from effectively penetrating less developed markets 
by influencing who they can lend to and how. This paper studies how foreign banks may be able to 
overcome distance constraints by comparing the lending practices1 and outcomes of domestic and foreign 
banks. It is novel as it focuses on a group of firms that borrow simultaneously from both domestic and 
foreign banks, which allows holding constant differences in their clienteles. Understanding whether and 
how foreign banks may be able to overcome distance constraints and penetrate new and less developed 
markets is key for understanding the role they can play in such markets and designing supportive policies.  
Distance-related information constraints can put foreign banks at an informational disadvantage vis-
à-vis their domestic competitors, particularly when lending to smaller, more opaque firms. Such 
constraints can arise because of (i) the greater geographical distance between the bank’s headquarters 
(principal) and the local branches (agent), (ii) differences in corporate culture, legal environment, and 
institutional framework between the home and the host country, and (iii) steeper organizational structures. 
Due to their typically larger size and legal structure (i.e., a parent abroad), foreign banks have more 
hierarchical organizational structures (i.e., more layers in the decision making) that create diseconomies in 
lending to smaller, more opaque firms. The maintained assumption is that lending to such firms relies 
heavily on “soft” information that is difficult to quantify and transmit to the higher levels of the 
 
                                                
1 In the following, we use the terms “lending practices” and “lending technologies” interchangeably. We follow the 
definition in Berger and Udell (2006) by defining “a lending technology as a unique combination of primary 
information source, screening and underwriting policies/procedures, loan contract structure, and monitoring 
strategies and mechanisms.” While Degryse, Laeven and Ongena (2009) use the same term, other authors use 
alternative terms such as lending behavior, bank lending decisions, lending patterns and credit assessment processes 
(see, among others, Agarwal and Hauswald (2010) and Liberti, Seru and Vig (2016)).  
 3 
organization, where the credit allocation decision lies.2 As a result, foreign banks are often argued to shy 
away from smaller, more opaque firms and focus primarily on larger, more transparent firms, i.e., focus on 
the segments of the market where their informational disadvantage vis-à-vis their local competitors is less 
pronounced as predicted in Dell'Ariccia and Marquez (2004).3 Although the evidence is far from 
conclusive, several studies find indeed that foreign banks tend shy away from smaller firms.4  
Contract design and credit scoring models, however, can help foreign banks to mitigate their 
informational disadvantage vis-à-vis their local competitors (see, among others, Berger and Udell (2006) 
and Sengupta (2007)). Contractual features such as collateral and maturity can be used to mitigate 
asymmetric information problems in credit markets. An extensive theoretical literature motivates 
collateral as a way to mitigate ex ante and ex post asymmetric informational frictions in credit markets.5 In 
the absence of reliable and audited financial statements, where lenders cannot rely on debt covenants to 
ensure entrepreneurial commitment, shorter loan maturities can also serve as an alternative disciplining 
tool (e.g., Berlin and Mester (1992); Myers (1977)). Lending at shorter maturities can help banks to screen 
and monitor their clients by forcing more frequent information disclosure and renegotiation of contract 
terms (e.g., Barnea, Haugen and Senbet (1980); Diamond (1991); Flannery (1986); Hart and Moore 
 
                                                
2 Theory suggests that private non-verifiable information, often referred to as “soft” information, is difficult to 
transmit across organizational layers. Reasons vary from reduced incentives to produce such information ex ante in 
anticipation that it will be ignored at the higher levels of the organization (Aghion and Tirole (1997); Stein (2002)), 
to incentives to strategically manipulate such information when incentives across the various layers of the 
organization do not perfectly align (Crawford (1982)), and to the high costs to ex post communicate such 
information across organizational layers (Bolton and Dewatripont (1994); Radner (1993); Sah and Stiglitz (1986)). 
 
3 See also Detragiache, Gupta and Tressel (2008), Gormley (2014), and Sengupta (2007). 
 
4 Using a variety of techniques and samples, several studies document that foreign banks tend to shy away from 
smaller, more opaque borrowers (see, among others, Beck and Martínez Pería (2010); Berger, Klapper, Martínez 
Pería and Zaidi (2008); Berger, Klapper and Udell (2001); Clarke, Cull, Martínez Pería and Sanchez (2005); De 
Haas, Ferreira and Taci (2010); Detragiache, et al. (2008); Gormley (2010); Mian (2006)). Others find that foreign 
banks are at least as likely to lend to small firms as domestic banks (see, among others, Berger, Rosen and Udell 
(2007); Clarke, et al. (2005); Giannetti and Ongena (2009); Giannetti and Ongena (2012)) using transaction-based 
lending, consistent with survey evidence in De la Torre, Martínez Pería and Schmukler (2010) and Beck, Demirgüç-
Kunt and Martínez Pería (2011). 
 
5 A set of theoretical models focuses on ex ante private information and shows that collateral can be used to sort 
observationally equivalent borrowers through signaling (e.g., Besanko and Thakor (1987); Bester (1985); Bester 
(1987); Boot, Thakor and Udell (1991)). A second set of theories focuses on ex post frictions and shows that 
collateral can mitigate moral hazard and bank losses in the event of borrower default (e.g., Aghion and Bolton 
(1997); Boot, et al. (1991); Boot and Thakor (1994); Hart and Moore (1994); Holmstrom and Tirole (1997)). 
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(1994); Rajan (1992)). Credit scoring models can also allow banks to “harden” soft information and 
transmit it to the higher levels of the organization enabling its use in the credit allocation process. Credit 
scoring allows banks to compile both hard and soft information into credit scores (e.g., Agarwal and 
Hauswald (2010); Liberti and Mian (2009); Petersen (2004)) and reduce the adverse impact of distance 
between banks and their borrowers on loan defaults (DeYoung, Glennon and Nigro (2008)).  
Controlling for possible differences in their clienteles, we examine whether foreign banks use 
contract design and credit scoring models to overcome their informational disadvantage vis-à-vis their 
local competitors and whether such mechanisms are effective. Informed and motivated by the extant 
literature, we bring the following predictions to the data. First, if foreign banks use such mechanisms to 
overcome distance-related information frictions as we argue, we should observe that foreign banks are 
more likely to require collateral and lend at shorter maturities, even when lending to the same customers 
in the same month as the domestic banks. Second, foreign banks should be more likely to price their loans 
using internal credit scores and rely on the provision of collateral, thus using hard(ened) information and 
hard assets, while domestic banks should rely less on such hard(ened) information and more on soft 
information acquired through relationships with clients. Third, the tendency to rely on such mechanisms 
should be larger when information asymmetries are more severe. We should also observe that the use of 
such mechanisms reduces over time as information asymmetries decrease. Fourth, if such screening and 
monitoring mechanisms are effective, we should not observe any systematic differences in the ex post 
performance of domestic and foreign loans, when holding differences in their clienteles constant.  
We bring these four predictions to the data. We begin by comparing the contract terms and loan 
pricing models of domestic and foreign banks within a country, holding constant differences in their 
clienteles. We eliminate the compositional bias and compare the contract terms and loan pricing models of 
domestic and foreign banks when lending to exactly the same firm in the same month using both 
regression and matching analyses.6 Exploring within-firm and month variation allows us to control for 
unobserved firm characteristics. We are thus able to separate the two different effects of foreign bank 
 
                                                
6 We additionally control for the firm’s length, strength, and breath of its lending relationship with each bank. 
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entry — the focus on different clienteles and the use of different lending technologies and loan pricing 
models — by focusing completely on the latter. To examine whether unobserved heterogeneity in the 
purpose of the loan drives our results, we exploit exogenous (to the firm) variation in bank ownership. 
Using the takeover of a domestic bank by a foreign bank, we study whether loan contract terms to the 
same firm change after the takeover using a difference-in-difference analysis.7 To examine whether 
distance-related information constraints are driving the observed differences, we exploit variation in the 
form of foreign bank entry (branches vs. subsidiaries), time since entry or since becoming foreign owned, 
and geographical distance between loan origination and the bank’s headquarters. In the final part of the 
analysis, we study the ex post performance of domestic and foreign bank loans by looking at both the 
incidence of repayment problems as well as the banks’ returns on loans.  
The analysis uses loan-level data from the public credit registry of Bolivia for the period between 
March 1999 and December 2003. The data include detailed loan information such as date of loan 
origination, maturity date, contract terms, loan amount, collateral, maturity, interest rates, the geographical 
location (region) in which the loan was originated, and ex post repayment information as well as data on 
firm characteristics such as legal structure, industry, banking relationships, and repayment behavior.8 The 
Bolivian credit market provides a good setting for several reasons. During the sample period, Bolivia’s 
banking sector was fully private, eliminating distortions from government-owned banks. Foreign and 
domestic banks are subject to the same regulations such that there is no differential regulatory treatment, 
which could influence our results. Both the number and market shares of domestic and foreign banks are 
relatively balanced and stable during the sample period, enabling meaningful comparisons (Claessens and 
van Horen (2014)). Like many other developing countries that recently opened their doors to foreign 
banks, Bolivia’s credit markets are opaque and underdeveloped. Many firms do not have audited financial 
statements, and if they do, the quality of such statements is often poor (Sirtaine, Skamnelos and Frank 
 
                                                
7 To control for changes in the macroeconomic and banking conditions over the comparison period, we use loans to 
the same firms by their other (non-taken-over) banks both before and after the acquisition as a control group. 
 
8 While the use of credit registries has become more prominent in recent years, the Bolivian credit registry offers 
unique advantages. Contrary to many other credit registries, the Bolivian credit registry does not have a reporting 
threshold (i.e., all loans originated by any formal financial institution are included) and includes detailed and reliable 
loan-level information on contract terms, including interest rates and collateral, often not available in other registries.  
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(2004)). Bolivia thus provides a setting with high information asymmetries affecting screening and 
monitoring of borrowers and a balanced set of both domestic and foreign banks. It is thus interesting to 
understand how in such an opaque setting foreign banks may be able to overcome their distance-related 
information constraints and meet firms’ financing needs, thus facilitating investment and growth. Bolivia 
shares with many other developing economies the characteristic of having a small and relatively 
concentrated banking market, which again makes it a good case to study. 
We find that foreign banks are more likely to require collateral and lend at shorter maturities. In 
particular, when comparing the terms of loans originated by domestic and foreign banks to the same firm 
in the same month, we find that foreign bank loans are, on average, 28 percentage points more likely to 
have collateral and have maturities that are about 27% shorter than domestic bank loans. We also find that 
foreign banks charge loan interest rates that are, on average, between 89 to 107 basis points lower than the 
interest rates of domestic banks — a 9% discount relative to the interest rate of domestic bank loans in the 
sample. We obtain similar results when we examine how the terms of loans to the same firms change 
when their (domestic) bank is taken over by a foreign bank. We find an increase in the incidence of 
collateral by 28 percentage points and a decrease in loan maturity by 48%. Drops in loan interest rates are 
not found to be statistically significant or as economically important in this exercise. Overall, these results 
suggest that unobserved heterogeneity in the purpose of the loan is unlikely to be driving the documented 
differences with respect to collateral and maturity. In additional robustness tests, we confirm these results 
are not driven by biases arising from the joint determination of contract terms and sample selection. 
Distinguishing between foreign banks into branches and subsidiaries reveals that at the point of entry 
or becoming foreign owned, differences in collateral and maturity (vis-à-vis domestic banks) are more 
pronounced for branches than subsidiaries. This is not surprising as subsidiaries enjoy greater 
organizational autonomy from their parent companies. Information asymmetries with respect to the local 
economy, its culture and institutions are also more pronounced for branches than subsidiaries that are 
former domestic banks. However, as time since entry increases or becoming foreign owned increases, 
branches become more like domestic banks, while subsidiaries begin to behave more like foreign banks, in 
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line with the expectation that information asymmetries for new entrants decrease, while subsidiaries begin 
adopting their lending policies to their steeper organizational structure.9  
When studying how domestic and foreign banks price their loans, we find that domestic banks base 
their pricing on the length of their relationship with the firm, especially in the case of smaller, more 
opaque firms. Foreign banks instead have a more transaction-based pricing approach, relying on credit 
scores and collateral, especially for larger, more transparent firms. We also show that credit scores and 
collateral explain a larger variation in the pricing of the foreign banks loans, particularly for larger, more 
transparent firms. Overall, our findings indicate that domestic and foreign banks can cater to the same 
clientele using different lending technologies. Domestic banks seem to overcome information 
asymmetries in credit markets using relationship lending, while foreign banks rely more on transaction-
based technologies such as asset-based lending, shorter maturities, and credit scoring models. 
But are domestic and foreign banks equally successful? Do alternative lending technologies allow 
foreign banks to mitigate their distance constraints and profitably lend to the same firms as domestic 
banks? To answer this question, we study the ex post performance of domestic and foreign bank loans by 
looking at both the incidence of repayment problems as well as the banks’ return on loans, taking into 
account not only the probability of default but also the loss given default. When comparing loans 
originated by domestic and foreign banks to the same firm in the same month, we find that loans 
originated by foreign banks are more likely to have repayments problems, consistent with foreign banks 
facing higher monitoring costs. This is more pronounced when foreign banks depart from their business 
model, lending without collateral and/or with longer maturities. Interestingly, we find that foreign banks 
are not at a disadvantage vis-à-vis domestic banks when lending with collateral and more short-term. 
Our paper contributes to the literature on foreign bank entry and is most closely related to Mian 
(2006). Compared to Mian (2006) who focuses on differences in clienteles of foreign and domestic banks, 
the first effect of foreign bank entry, we explore differences in lending technologies to a given and 
identical clientele— the second effect of foreign bank entry. Mian (2006) finds that informational 
 
                                                
9 Everything else equal, the takeover increases the geographical and organizational distance between loan officers 
and the bank’s headquarters.   
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disadvantages pertaining to cultural and geographical distance constraints make foreign banks shy away 
from smaller, more opaque firms. We additionally find that foreign banks employ contractual mechanisms 
and loan pricing models to overcome their informational disadvantages vis-à-vis their local competitors. 
Consistent with theoretical predictions, we find that collateral and maturity can be effective contract 
design mechanisms that can help foreign banks overcome their informational disadvantages.10 
Our results also provide an explanation for results in Qian and Strahan (2007) and Haselmann, 
Pistor and Vig (2010) who find that foreign banks are more sensitive to improvements in collateral laws 
and creditor rights. The strengthening of formal creditor rights protection is argued to help foreign banks 
to more effectively use collateral and maturity to overcome cultural and informational barriers. As 
Haselmann, et al. (2010) put it “legal protection may offer a substitute for cultural and local knowledge.” 
Our findings confirm this explanation. They also provide an explanation for results in Bruno and 
Hauswald (2014) and Claessens and van Horen (2014) who show that foreign bank entry has a positive 
effect in countries with more efficient credit information sharing systems and creditor rights protection, 
consistent with theoretical predictions in Sengupta (2007) and Gormley (2014).  
Finally, our paper also relates to an extensive literature on the importance of geographic and 
cultural distance between borrowers and lenders, which shows that loan contract terms and lending 
techniques are a critical function of the geographical distance between borrowers and lenders (e.g., 
Agarwal and Hauswald (2010); Degryse and Ongena (2005); Hauswald and Marquez (2006)), as well as 
the extent to which borrowers and lenders share cultural, ethnic, religious or socio-economic traits (e.g., 
Beck, Behr and Madestam (2014); Fisman, Paravisini and Vig (2016)). Our paper also relates to the 
literature on organizational distance. Several papers have shown that the internal organizational distance 
within institutions, which can be both a function of ownership and size, matters for lending techniques 
(e.g., Berger, Miller, Petersen, Rajan and Stein (2005); Mian (2006); Stein (2002)). Overall, these studies 
 
                                                
10 While we do not directly focus on the competition between entering foreign and incumbent domestic banks, our 
results on collateral are consistent with predictions in Sengupta (2007) who shows that lower-cost entrants can use 
collateral as a screening device to contest the incumbent banks’ informational advantage.  
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find that distance increases inefficiency in credit markets.11 We contribute to this literature by showing 
that contract design and credit scoring can help foreign banks overcome such constraints.  
While we cannot make welfare statements, our findings have important repercussions for capital 
allocation and the role of foreign banks in less developed financial markets. Our findings suggest that 
foreign banks may only be able to finance larger more transparent firms and/or firms with short-term 
financing needs and pledgeable assets. If domestic banks cannot redirect their resources and cover the 
funding needs of the remaining segment of the credit market (e.g., because the quality of the remaining 
borrower pool is too low), this segment of the market will find it more difficult to obtain credit than in an 
economy with only domestic banks. Depending on the distribution of firms in the economy, the relative 
costs of lenders, and the cost of acquiring information, the overall effect may thus be negative (Gormley 
(2014)). Foreign bank entry in this case could also push existing clients towards more short-term 
investment strategies and financing of tangible assets, and away from longer-term projects and intangible 
assets.12 Foreign bank entry could also have important implications for firms’ funding costs. While firms 
that can obtain funding from foreign banks may be able to borrow at lower interest rates, the remaining 
firms will have to pay higher borrowing costs, reflecting the domestic banks’ worse borrower pool and 
market power (see, for example, Dell'Ariccia and Marquez (2004); Gormley (2014); von Thadden (2004)). 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the dataset and presents 
descriptive statistics. Section 3 presents our empirical tests. Section 4 presents our results and several 
robustness checks, and Section 5 concludes. 
2. Data 
The paper utilizes data from the Central de Información de Riesgos Crediticios (CIRC), the public credit 
registry of Bolivia, provided by the Bolivian Superintendent of Banks and Financial Entities (SBEF). 
 
                                                
11 The growing literature on securitization finds similar results. By creating a larger distance between the loan 
originator and the bearer of a loan’s default risk, securitization decreases lenders’ incentives to screen and monitor 
borrowers (e.g., Keys, Mukherjee, Seru and Vig (2010); Rajan, Seru and Vig (2015); Skrastins and Vig (2014)). 
 
12 Gormley (2010), for example, finds that the entry of foreign banks in India in the 1990s had an overall negative 
effect on bank lending, which was larger for smaller firms and firms with fewer tangible assets. 
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Since CIRC’s creation in 1989, the SBEF requires all formal (licensed and regulated) financial institutions 
operating in Bolivia to record information on all loans. We have access to the entire credit registry for the 
period between January 1998 and December 2003. For each loan, we have information on the origination 
and maturity dates, the geographical location (region) in which the loan was originated, contract terms, 
and ex post performance. For each borrower, we have information about their legal structure, industry, 
bank lending relationships, and whether they have been delinquent or have defaulted on another loan in 
the recent past. The credit registry is used by the SBEF to monitor and supervise the banking sector. It is 
also used by banks to better evaluate and monitor their clients. The SBEF requires that some “hard” 
borrower and loan information is shared among banks to alleviate the otherwise pervasive information 
asymmetries in Bolivian credit market. After written authorization from a prospective customer, a lender 
can access the registry and obtain a report that contains information on all outstanding loans of the 
customer for the previous two months. Entries include the originating bank, loan amount, loan type, value 
of collateral, value of overdue payments, and the borrower’s internal credit rating from the originating 
bank. Because the available information is limited to the previous two months, important information 
asymmetries remain. For example, if borrowers pay back an overdue loan, the record resets without any 
trace of overdue payments on their credit history, which borrowers may exploit strategically.13  
The data include loans from both commercial banks and nonbank financial institutions (e.g., 
microfinance institutions, credit unions, mutual societies, and general deposit warehouses). To keep the set 
of lenders homogenous in terms of financial structure and regulation, we focus exclusively on loans 
granted by commercial banks to firms. Table 1 provides a list of the 13 commercial banks that were active 
in Bolivia during the sample period, seven of which are foreign-owned. Following the literature, a bank is 
considered foreign if at least 50 percent of its equity is owned by foreign investors (see among others 
Claessens and van Horen (2014)). Four of the foreign banks are branches and three are subsidiaries and, 
together, they account for 39% of the commercial banks’ loans. Branches are integral parts of the parent 
 
                                                
13 As shown in Ioannidou and Ongena (2010) borrowers strategically reset their credit histories before approaching 
new lenders. The authors also show that controlling for other observable characteristics, overdue payments on past 
loans — even when repayment is eventually made — are predictive of future repayment problems. Hence, this 
information, if made available could help banks better evaluate new customers.  
 
 11 
company, while subsidiaries are separate legal entities from their parent corporations. As can be observed 
in Table 1, many of the branches are part of large multinational banks with a relatively small presence in 
Bolivia. Most foreign banks have a lower cost of deposits than most domestic banks. On average, foreign 
banks pay 100 basis points lower interest rates on their deposits.  
(Insert Table 1 about here) 
For the purposes of our analysis, we focus on commercial loans granted between March 1999 and 
December 2003.14 Commercial loans represent an important segment of the credit markets for which 
collateral is a negotiated term that is only sometimes present. Among commercial loans, there are several 
types of contracts in the data, including credit cards, overdrafts, installment loans, single-payment loans, 
and credit lines. We focus exclusively on installment and single-payment loans and refer to these as 
“standard debt contracts”. These contracts account for 92% of the total value of commercial loans during 
the sample period. Of these contracts, 98% are denominated in U.S. dollars, and we use only these loans in 
our analysis. To ensure the use of timely information, we only study the originations of “new loans”; 
renegotiations of previous loans and loans drawn on pre-existing lines of credit are excluded.15  
All in all, this yields 32,279 loans to 2,672 firms. Table 2 provides summary statistics for these 
32,279 loans, which we refer to as the “universe”. The stars next to the mean values of domestic bank 
loans indicate whether the differences between domestic and foreign banks are statistically significant. 
Throughout the text, ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Table 
A1 in the Appendix provides detailed definitions for all variables used. The comparison shows striking 
differences between domestic and foreign bank loans, which might be partly due to different borrower 
 
                                                
14 Although we have data as of January 1998, we start our sample in March 1999 since prior to this date the data do 
not allow us to distinguish between commercial and consumer loans. We use prior information from January 1998 
through February 1999 to fill in the history of bank-firm relationships as well as the firms’ credit history. 
 
15 Renegotiations are identified as follows. Banks are required to indicate whether a new loan is a renegotiation of a 
previous performing or nonperforming loan. We use this information to exclude renegotiation. Loans drawn on pre-
existing lines of credit, instead, are identified as follows. When a borrower draws on a pre-existing line of credit, a 
“new loan” appears in the registry with an origination date and contact terms as of the date the bank originated the 
credit line. Since the date the loan first appears in the registry is subsequent to the origination date, we can identify 
when a “new loan” is a draw on a pre-existing line of credit and exclude it from our sample.  
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population and partly due to different loan conditions.16 To understand whether differences in contract 
terms between domestic and foreign bank loans are partly driven by different lending technologies, we 
eliminate the firm-composition effect by comparing the contract terms of domestic and foreign bank loans 
to the same firm in the same month. To this end, we restrict our analysis to a sub-sample of loans to firms 
that received a new loan from at least one foreign and one domestic bank in the same month. The 
restriction results in a sub-sample of 5,137 loans to 287 firms, which we referred to as “Our Sample”. Our 
sample constitutes 25% of the total lending amount in the “Universe”. Table 2 provides summary statistics 
for our sample and compares it to the “Universe”. Statistics are provided for all loans in the sample as well 
as for foreign and domestic banks separately. The stars next to each mean value indicate whether it is 
statistically different from its corresponding value for the “Universe”.17  
(Insert Table 2 about here) 
As can be observed in Table 2, our sub-sample draws more heavily on the largest firms. For 
example, the average loan amount and the outstanding bank debt are significantly higher in our sub-
sample than in the universe. Similarly, sole proprietorships are much less common, while joint stock 
companies are more frequent. With respect to credit quality results are somewhat mixed. The incidence of 
past repayment problems is higher in our sub-sample, suggesting riskier firms. With respect to relationship 
characteristics, we find that firms in our sample have on average longer relationships with their banks but 
are less likely to have a primary bank, which is expected given that we focus on firms with multiple 
relationships that tend to be larger. When comparing the terms of domestic and foreign bank loans in our 
sub-sample, some striking differences emerge. Loans originated by foreign banks are on average smaller 
by around US$20,000 and carry interest rates that are lower by around 86 basis points. Foreign bank loans 
are also more likely to be secured: 46% of the foreign bank loans have collateral, while only 19% of 
 
                                                
16 Foreign bank loans are larger, have lower interest rates, are more likely to be secured, and have shorter maturities. 
Consistent with predictions in Dell’Arricia and Marquez (2004), the clients of foreign banks are, on average, larger. 
They also tend to be riskier firms with “weaker” bank-lending relationships, consistent with worse credit allocation 
when competition is more intense (as in Hauswald and Marquez (2010)). 
 
17 In particular, we construct a specific test statistic with a correspondingly adjusted variance for our mean 
comparisons. This test statistic accounts for the fact that we compare the means of the entire sample with the means 
of a sub-sample. The derivation of the statistic and its asymptotic behavior is available upon request. 
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domestic bank loans do. Their maturities are also shorter by around 3 months. Foreign bank loans are less 
likely to carry the highest internal rating than domestic bank loans.  
In regression analysis, we also present results for sub-samples of smaller and larger firms within 
the sample of firms that borrow from both domestic and foreign banks in the same month. As information 
on total firm assets is not available (for confidentiality reasons the firm identities were altered before 
releasing the data to us), we approximate firm size with total bank debt.18 For each firm we calculate the 
average outstanding debt across all financial institutions over the sample period and divide firms into 
smaller and larger firms using the median firm’s total bank debt (US$1,014,978). In robustness tests, we 
also try alternative sample splits using instead the 30th and 70th percentiles of the total bank debt 
(US$466,568 and US$2,329,930, respectively).  
3. Methodology 
We examine whether domestic and foreign banks employ different lending technologies by conducting 
two sets of empirical specifications. We first test whether loans originated by domestic and foreign banks 
have systematically different loan contract terms. We compare the incidence of collateral, the maturities, 
and the interest rates of loans originated by domestic and foreign banks to the same firm in the same 
month, controlling for several other factors that might explain any observed differences between them. In 
a second step, we also explore whether domestic and foreign banks use systematically different factors to 
price their loans. Specifically, we gauge whether the incidence of collateral, the rating of the firm by the 
bank and the length, depth and breadth of the relationship affect the pricing of loans and whether these 
relationships vary significantly across banks of different ownership. 
To investigate whether domestic and foreign banks impose systematically different loan 
conditions on their clients we estimate the following model using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS): 
 
                                                
18 Using data from the U.S. Survey of Small Business Finances (SSBF), Petersen and Rajan (1994) find that 
conditional on the existence of institutional debt, the ratio of bank debt to total debt does not significantly vary with 
firm size. For firms with less than $15,000 in total assets, this ratio is equal to 51 percent, while for firms with more 
than $2,000,000 in total assets the ratio equals 62 percent. Since capital markets are less developed in Bolivia than in 
the US, this ratio may vary even less, such that total bank debt is most likely highly correlated with firm size. 
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LoanContractijkt = α1 + β1ForeignBankk + β2Firmjkt + β3Loanijkt +ηj×γt + εijkt,  (1) 
where i, j, k, t index loans, firms, banks, and time (month-year) of loan origination, respectively. For 
LoanContractijkt we employ three dependent variables: (i) a dummy indicating whether the loan contract 
includes the pledge of collateral, (ii) the natural logarithm of one plus the number of months between loan 
origination and maturity, and (iii) the loan interest rate minus the rate on US Treasury securities of 
comparable maturity at loan origination. Our key explanatory variable, ForeignBankk, is a dummy 
variable that indicates whether the originating bank is foreign-owned. This variable is time invariant as 
during the sample period there are no changes in bank ownership. In a robustness test, however, we extend 
our sample period backwards to study the takeover of a domestic bank by foreign investors.  
Our set of control variables includes several indicators that control for firm and other loan 
characteristics as well as firm-month fixed effects. The vector Firmjkt is comprised of firm characteristics 
that vary within the same month across banks. This includes the firm’s internal rating at each bank as well 
as indicators of the strength of the bank-firm lending relationship at the time of the loan origination. For 
ratings, we include two dummy variables: Rating2jkt and Rating3&4jkt. Rating2jkt equals one if the firm’s 
rating equals 2, and equals zero otherwise, while Rating3&4jkt equals one if the firm’s rating equals either 
3 or 4, and equals zero otherwise.19 (Rating1jkt, which indicates the best rating, is the omitted category.) 
These ratings refer both to “hard” information about firms as well as “hardened” soft or subjective 
information collected by the loan officer in the screening process. They can vary across banks for different 
reasons, including different soft and hard information sets and different interpretation of available 
information. To gauge the intensity of a bank-firm relationship we employ three variables: RelDurationjkt, 
RelScopejkt, and PrimaryBankjkt. RelDurationjkt is equal to the natural logarithm of one plus the number of 
months we observe the bank-firm pair in a credit relationship;20 RelScopejkt is a dummy variable indicating 
 
                                                
19 To gain statistical power, ratings 3 and 4 are merged into one dummy variable given the small number of loans 
with such ratings (see descriptive statistics in Table 2).  
 
20 RelDuration_Squarejk (i.e., the square of RelDurationjk) is also sometimes included in our specifications. For our 
baseline results, we estimated the regressions with and without the square term to test for the possibility of a non-
linear relationship. If the square term is found to be statistically significant, we report the regression results with the 
square term. If not, we report the results without the square term.  
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whether the firm has other credit products from the bank (e.g., credit cards, overdrafts, mortgages); and 
PrimaryBankjkt indicates whether the bank accounts for more than 50 percent of the firm’s bank debt.  
The vector Loanijkt includes other loan characteristics such as Installmentijkt and LoanAmountijk. 
Installmentijkt is a dummy variable indicating whether the loan is an installment loan as opposed to a 
single-payment loan and LoanAmountijk is measured as the natural logarithm of one plus the amount of 
loan proceeds at origination in US dollars. In the interest rate regressions, we also include Collateralijkt, 
and Maturityijkt, effectively assuming that these contract terms are determined prior to the loan interest 
rate, consistent with the maintained assumption in most of the extant empirical literature in banking (e.g., 
Berger and Udell (1995); Degryse and Ongena (2005); Elsas and Krahnen (1998); Harhoff and Körting 
(1998); Ortiz-Molina and Penas (2008)). Since each of these other contract terms may be simultaneously 
determined with the dependent variable and is thus potentially endogenous, we first estimate our models 
without other contract terms among the controls. In robustness tests presented below, we also employ a 
matching technique as in Ioannidou and Ongena (2010) and an instrumental variable (IV) approach 
following Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders and Srinivasan (2011).  
Finally, ηj×γt, are firm fixed effects, ηj, interacted with time (month-year) fixed effects, γt, to 
account for observable and unobservable firm characteristics. Our estimates are thus obtained using only 
within firm-month variation for the sub-sample of firms that borrow from both domestic and foreign banks 
in the same month. This is the reason for which we do not include time-invariant firm characteristics. In 
addition to estimating the above regression for the whole sample, we also estimate it separately for firms 
of different size using their total outstanding bank debt as a proxy of their size. We use OLS for all three 
dependent variables. For collateral, we use OLS instead of non-linear Probit or Logit models as we would 
otherwise lose a large number of firm-month clusters with no variation in collateral across different banks 
for the same firm within the same month.21 In all cases, the standard errors are clustered at the firm level 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
21 Because of the large number of fixed effects in our model relative to the smaller number of periods for which a 
borrower is observed, a non-linear model could also give inconsistent estimates; this is known as the “incidental 
parameter problem” (see, for example, discussion in Cameron and Trivedi (2005, pp. 726-727).  
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to account for the possibility that the observations of the same firm across different loans, bank, and time 
are correlated with each other.22  
Given our set of controls variables, a statistically significant β1 would indicate that the probability 
of collateral, the maturity and the interest rates on domestic and foreign bank loans to the same firm in the 
same month are systematically different, even after controlling for possible differences in banks’ credit 
risk assessment, the strength of the bank-firm lending relationship, as well as other loan contract terms. If 
foreign banks are using collateral and maturity to mitigate information asymmetries and agency conflicts, 
we would expect that they will be more likely to require collateral and lend at shorter maturities than 
domestics banks, even when lending to the same customers. 
Next, we examine whether the factors that explain the variation in the loan interest rates to the 
same firm in the same month vary systematically between domestic and foreign banks by introducing 
interactions between the foreign bank dummy and our control variables: 
             LoanSpreadijkt = α2 + γ1ForeignBankk + γ2Firmjkt + γ3Loanijkt +  
                                        γ4ForeignBankk×Firmjkt + γ5ForeignBankk×Loan ijkt + ηj× γt + εijkt, (2) 
where i, j, k, t index loans, firms, banks, and time (month-year), respectively. All variables are defined as 
in equation (1). In this case, our focus is on the coefficients of the interaction terms, which indicate 
whether internal credit ratings, relationship strength, and other loan contract terms are used differently by 
domestic and foreign banks when pricing their loans. Since the coefficients are again estimated using only 
within firm-month variation such differences would point to the use of different lending technologies. If, 
for example, foreign banks rely more on transaction-based technologies, such as credit scoring and asset-
based finance, we would expect credit ratings and collateral to play a more prominent role in foreign 
banks’ pricing. Similarly, if domestic banks rely more on relationship lending, we expect the relationship 
 
                                                
22 In unreported sensitivity analyses, we also test the robustness of our results to alternative clustering assumptions. 
Standard errors may be correlated at the bank level if bank-level shocks affect all loans given by a specific bank. We 
confirm our results when clustering standard errors at both the bank level and at the bank-year and firm level. 
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variables to be more important for the domestic banks’ pricing. As in the case of regression (1), the model 
is estimated using OLS clustering the error terms at the firm level. 
4. Results 
4.1 Bank ownership and loan contract terms  
The results in Table 3 show that foreign bank loans are more likely to have collateral and are more short-
term than domestic bank loans. Columns I to V present results of the collateral regressions and columns 
VI to X present results of the maturity regressions. As discussed earlier, both the collateral and the 
maturity regressions are estimated using OLS. In all cases, we include firm×time fixed effects and 
investigate whether the likelihood of pledging collateral and the maturity of loans vary systematically 
between domestic and foreign banks, even when lending to the same firm in the same month.  
(Insert Table 3 about here) 
As can be observed in columns I to III, foreign bank loans are between 27 and 28 percentage points 
more likely to have collateral; a large effect given that only 33% of all loan contracts in our sample 
include collateral. We also find that loans to firms with a rating of 2 rather than 1 are more likely to have 
collateral. Loans to firms with longer relationships and a primary bank status with a bank are less likely to 
have collateral.23 These results support previous empirical findings in the relationship lending literature 
(e.g., Berger and Udell (1995); Elsas and Krahnen (1998); Harhoff and Körting (1998); Machauer and 
Weber (1998); Petersen and Rajan (1994)). Controlling for other contract terms has no material effect on 
our findings. The coefficients of the other contract terms indicate that larger loans are more likely to have 
collateral. In columns IV and V, we also split the sample into smaller and larger firms and confirm the 
results for both groups. The results in columns VI-VIII show that loans granted by foreign banks have 
maturities that are between 19% and 27% shorter than loans granted by domestic banks. At the average 
maturity of nine months, this implies a difference of two to three months. With respect to our control 
 
                                                
23 Adding the square of RelDurationjk in the specification results in statistically insignificant coefficients for 
RelDurationjk and its square term. 
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variables, we find that variation in credit ratings is not significantly associated with variation in loan 
maturities. Relationship characteristics, on the other hand, seem to play an important role. Loans to firms 
with longer relationships (more than eleven months) and a primary bank status with a bank have longer 
maturities, consistent with the relationship lending literature. Additional products, on the other hand, are 
associated with shorter maturities, although this effect is significant only at the 10% level. Controlling for 
other contract terms results in a larger absolute coefficient for Foreign, suggesting that loan maturity is 
correlated with Installment and Loan Amount. The coefficients of the other contract terms indicate that 
installment loans and loans with larger loan amounts have longer maturities. Dividing our sample into 
smaller and larger firms in columns IX and X, confirms again our findings for both sets of firms.24  
 The results in Table 4 show that foreign banks charge the same firm in the same month about 89 
to 107 basis points lower interest rates than domestic banks, confirming the difference reported in the 
descriptive statistics. Relative to the interest rate of domestic bank loans, these estimates imply a 9% 
discount. As can be observed in column I, loans originated by foreign banks carry on average 89 basis 
points lower interest rates than loans originated by domestic banks. This difference is statistically 
significant at the 1% level and remains unchanged when we additionally control for possible differences in 
credit ratings and the strength of the bank-firm relationships in column II. Adding other contract terms in 
column III reveals that collateralized loans and loans with longer maturities have on average lower interest 
rates. The negative coefficient of collateral is consistent with the theoretical literature on the role of 
collateral in debt contracts.25 The negative coefficient on maturity is consistent with lower risk firms 
 
                                                
24 We also explore whether collateral and maturity are complements or substitutes as mechanisms to overcome 
information asymmetries and agency problems. We split domestic and foreign bank loans within our sample into 
four groups according to whether (i) they are secured or unsecured and (ii) have maturities below or above the 
median maturity in our sample. For foreign bank loans, we find that 65% of their secured loans have a below-median 
maturity, thus two-thirds of secured foreign bank loans also have a short maturity. On the other hand, among 
unsecured foreign banks loans, the distribution between below-median (52%) and above-median (48%) loans is 
much more even. There is no comparable difference for domestic bank loans.  In summary, foreign banks seem to 
use collateral and short maturity as complements rather than substitutes. 
 
25 The lower interest rates on secured loans are consistent with both the ex ante and the ex post theories of collateral. 
Under the ex-ante theories unobservably safer borrowers are more likely to pledge collateral to signal their quality 
and receive lower interest rates (e.g., Bester (1985, 1987)). Under the ex post theories, observably riskier borrowers 
are more likely to be required to pledge collateral to mitigates ex post frictions such as moral hazard and bank losses 
in the default (e.g., Boot, et al. (1991); Boot and Thakor (1994); Holmstrom and Tirole (1997)). Hence, conditioning 
on borrower risk, the ex post theories are also consistent with lower interest rates for secured loans. 
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(projects) obtaining loans with longer maturities. Controlling for other contract terms in column III does 
not qualitatively change the foreign bank result, but the estimated coefficient becomes bigger in absolute 
terms: it increases from -89 to -107 basis points, suggesting that loan interest rates are correlated with 
other contract terms and bank ownership. With respect to other control variables, we find that lower credit 
ratings are associated with significantly higher interest rates, while stronger lending relationships are 
typically associated with lower interest rates. Dividing the sample into smaller and larger firms confirms 
again our findings for both groups (columns IV and V). The estimated difference is 113 basis points for 
larger firms and 96 basis points for smaller firms.26 The remaining columns of Table 4 show that 
differences in market shares and funding costs do not explain the interest rate differential.27 ForeignBank 
continues to enter with the same economic and statistical significance as before, while neither funding 
costs nor market shares enter significantly.28 
(Insert Table 4 about here) 
Overall, our findings suggest that foreign banks are more likely to require collateral, grant loans with 
shorter maturities, and charge lower interest rates, even when lending to the same firm in the same month 
and this holds for both smaller and larger firms.29 There is thus a clear trade-off for firms when taking out 
loans from both domestic and foreign banks, which may explain why firms maintain active relationships 
with both domestic and foreign banks. These findings are consistent with our first hypothesis that foreign 
banks use contract terms to help overcome distance-related information asymmetries. There could be, 
however, concerns about omitted variable biases, alternative explanations, or estimation techniques. In the 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
26 Similar results are obtained if we instead split firms using the 30th and 70th percentiles of the total outstanding bank 
debt with a 113 basis point estimated difference for larger firms and 92 basis points for smaller firms. The somewhat 
larger discounts for larger firms may be capturing economies of scales and smaller average costs of screening and 
monitoring larger loans and firms. This would be consistent with the presence of important fixed costs, for example. 
 
27 Table 1 shows that foreign banks have significantly lower funding costs and many of them have smaller market 
shares than domestic banks. These differences can in principle drive the interest rate differential that we find. Lower 
funding costs can allow foreign banks to charge lower loan interest rates. Our results admittedly cannot control for 
access to internal capital markets by foreign banks. Higher market shares may be associated with higher or lower 
interest rates depending on whether market power or economies of scale effects dominate. 
 
28 In unreported robustness tests, we also control for the cost of deposits in the maturity and collateral regressions. 
Like for the interest rate regressions, the coefficients of ForeignBank are not affected.   
 
29 In unreported robustness tests, we also study whether there are differences in the loan amounts of domestic and 
foreign bank loans using similar specifications, but find no differences. 
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next section, we subject our results to several robustness tests to address these concerns. Additional 
robustness tests, regarding sample selection are presented in Section 4.6 at the end of the paper. 
4.2 Robustness Checks 
First, we examine whether unobserved differences on the purpose of the loan are driving our results by 
exploiting exogenous (to the firm) variation in distance-related information asymmetries. We exploit 
exogenous (to the firm) variation in bank ownership using the takeover of the domestic Banco Boliviano 
Americano (BBA) by the foreign Banco de Crédito de Bolivia (BCR) in May 1999 — the only takeover 
event in our sample period.30 The takeover of a domestic bank by a foreign bank is expected to increase 
distance-related information constraints as it increases the geographical and organizational distance 
between the bank’s headquarters and the local branches and the borrowing firms. Greater organizational 
distance may add more layers in the credit allocation decision, favoring the use of more standardized 
process in evaluating and managing risks such as collateral and maturity. To perform this test, we identify 
all loans from the acquired bank (BBA) in the year prior to the merger. We then trace any loans that these 
firms received from the acquiring bank (BCR) in the three years following the acquisition, dropping all 
loans to firms that were already customers of BCR prior to the acquisition.31 This leaves us with 401 
loans, which we refer to as the treated group. To control for changes in the macroeconomic environment 
and the banking system over the comparison period, we use loans to the same firms by their other (non-
taken-over) banks before and after the acquisition as a control group. This leaves us with 766 loans, which 
we refer to as the control group. Using these two groups, we estimate: 
                     LoanContractijkt = α3 + δ1Treatedijkt + δ2Treatedijkt×Aftert+ δ3Aftert  
 
                                                
30 At the beginning of the sample period, one more bank changed ownership status. In particular, Banco Solidario’s 
ownership changed from domestic to foreign-owned when one of its three main investors moved outside Bolivia, 
making this a less clear case. 
 
31 For this exercise we extend the sample period backwards to April 1998. A disadvantage of using data prior to 1999 
is that we cannot distinguish between commercial and consumer credit. Using a difference-in-difference analysis 
with borrower fixed effects, ηj, allows us to mitigate this problem. 
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   + δ4Firmjkt + δ5Loanijk + δ6Bankkt + ηj + εijkt,   (3) 
where Treatedijkt equals one for all loans in the treated group, and equals zero for all loans in the control 
group. Aftert equals one for all loans originated after May 1999, and equals zero for all loans originated 
prior to May 1999. Treatedijkt×Aftert equals one for all loans in the treated group after the takeover in May 
1999. The reference group is loans by (non-taken-over) banks to the same firms prior to May 1999. Bankkt 
includes bank controls such as bank size, market share, and cost of deposits. All other variables are 
defined as in equation (1). The inclusion of firm fixed effects, ηj, in this specification is possible as the 
same firm has loans in both the treated and the control group. The coefficient of interest is δ2 which 
measures the systematic changes in the contract terms of the treated group before and after the acquisition 
relative to the control group. Results are reported in columns I-III of Table 5. We find that relative to the 
control group, the treated group experienced a large and significant increase in the likelihood of collateral 
and a drop in maturity. We find no significant changes in interest rates. Relative to the control group, the 
likelihood of collateral for the treated group increased by 28.8 percentage points, while maturity decreased 
by around 4.3 months. Similar results are obtained if Aftert is replaced with time fixed effects (columns 
IV-VI). Our findings in Table 5 show that exogenous (to the firm) changes in bank ownership have similar 
effects on collateral and maturity as those documented earlier and suggest that these differences are 
unlikely to be due to unobserved heterogeneity on the purpose of the loan. 
(Insert Table 5 about here) 
Next, we explore whether differences in collateral, maturity, and interest rates between domestic 
and foreign banks are due to an alternative bank “fixed-effect hypothesis”. It is possible, for example, that 
the banks that happen to be foreign in Bolivia have different lending styles independent of their location; 
this would imply that they also behave similarly as in Bolivia regardless of where they are, including in 
their own home countries. In order to test this, we focus on two foreign banks in our sample – Banco do 
Brasil and Citibank – for which we have loan-level data for the respective home country. In the case of 
Citibank, we use Dealscan data on syndicated loans to compare the incidence of collateral, maturity and 
all-in-spread-drawn of Citibank loans to those of other domestic banks in the United States in a regression 
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set-up similar to that for our Bolivian sample.32 Relative to other domestic banks, the bank fixed-effect 
hypothesis predicts a positive coefficient on collateral, a negative coefficient on maturity, and a negative 
coefficient on the spread (i.e., similar results as in Bolivia). Our results – available on request – do not 
show any significant differences in collateral, maturity and interest spread between Citibank loans and 
loans by other domestic banks in the United States, even when given to the same firms in the same 
quarter. In a second exercise, we compare the loan conditionality of the largest three Brazilian 
government-owned banks (one of which is Banco do Brasil)33 to the loan conditionality of other domestic 
banks in Brazil using a regression set-up similar to that of our Bolivian credit registry data. Our findings— 
available on request— do not provide evidence in line with the bank-fixed effect hypothesis. Compared to 
other domestic banks, two of the three government-owned banks are less likely to demand collateral and 
give longer maturity loans. Results with respect to loan spreads are not consistent across specifications.  
We also contrasted the behavior of Citibank and Banco do Brasil to other foreign banks in their 
respective home markets. For Citibank, we find again no systematic differences in contract terms. For the 
Brazilian exercise, we find that foreign banks in Brazil are more likely require collateral and shorter 
maturities than two out of the three domestic banks. For loan spreads, results were again inconsistent 
across specifications. The results for Brazil – another country with opaque credit markets and a weak 
institutional framework where the foreign banks’ distance constraints may be more binding – mirror our 
key findings for collateral and maturity in Bolivia. The absence of differences for the United States is 
consistent with limited information barriers. This may be due to a combination of strong and more 
transparent institutional framework and the use of syndicated loan data that draw heavily from larger, 
more transparent firms. Foreign banks may be still disadvantaged in more opaque segments of the U.S. 
market. Overall, these findings confirm that the differences between foreign and domestic bank-loans in 
Bolivia are explained by distance-related information asymmetries, which loom large in Bolivia and to 
some extent in Brazil, but much less in the syndicated loan market in the United States. 
 
                                                
32 The sample is constructed following Berg, Saunders and Steffen (2016). We are grateful to the authors for sharing 
their data and programs. 
 
33 For confidentiality reasons, we could not get identifying information for individual banks.  
 
 23 
Next, we subject our results to two robustness tests with respect to our estimation technique. First, 
we investigate the robustness of our findings using a matching technique instead of a regression analysis. 
Matching is nonparametric and thus imposes no functional form restrictions on the way the matching 
variables relate to the dependent variable. Although matching does not solve omitted variable issues 
arising from the joint determination of contract terms, it could help mitigate such concerns as it does not 
incorporate any information from outside the overlap region (i.e., it only uses observations and variation 
that satisfy the matching criteria). Regressions, instead, use variation across all observations and control 
for the average effect of any control variable on the dependent variable in a linear fashion.34 We match 
using a procedure similar to Ioannidou and Ongena (2010) and Degryse, Ioannidou and von Schedvin 
(2016), matching on each variable individually allowing for replacement and multiple neighbors. For 
discrete variables, we use exact matching. For continuous variables, we use caliber matching using a 0.5 
standard deviation radius for each of our matching variables. Table 6 reports our findings. In column I, we 
match on firm identity and month of loan origination. In column II, we additionally match on ratings and 
relationship characteristics. In column III, we also match on other contract terms as in Tables 3 and 4. We 
present results that correspond to our specifications in Tables 3 and 4. As can be observed in Table 6, in 
all cases we find results that are qualitatively similar to those presented earlier. 
(Insert Table 6 about here) 
Second, we re-estimate our models allowing collateral, maturity, and loan contract terms to be 
jointly determined using an IV framework as in Bharath, et al. (2011). Following Bharath, et al. (2011), 
we assume that the loan interest rate is set last; after all other contract terms are determined. Collateral and 
maturity instead are assumed to be set simultaneously and prior to the loan interest rate. This implies that 
collateral and maturity influence each other (a bidirectional relationship), while the loan interest rate 
spread is affected by collateral and maturity but not vice versa (a unidirectional relationship). We estimate 
the resulting system of equations using the two-stage-least squares (2SLS). Following Bharath, et al. 
(2011), we use a dummy for industries with fewer tangible assets as an instrument for collateral, a dummy 
 
                                                
34 See, for example, discussions in Ioannidou and Ongena (2010) and Roberts and Whited (2012).  
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for regulated industries for maturity, and the average loan spread of all banks over the previous six months 
for loan spreads.35, 36 The IV approach necessitates two modifications to our benchmark models. First, we 
cannot include firm×time fixed effects since the instruments do not vary in a given month within a firm. 
Second, the bidirectional relationship between collateral and maturity requires adding maturity in the 
collateral equation and collateral in the maturity equation. To be able to compare the IV estimates to 
estimates obtained ignoring the joint determination of contract terms, we re-estimate our models adopting 
these modifications. Results are reported in Table 7 (columns (a)). The coefficients of the foreign bank 
dummy are very similar to those reported earlier (see columns III and VIII of Table 3 and column III of 
Table 4).37 In the second set of specifications (columns (b)), we add the instrument of the dependent 
variable as an additional explanatory variable in the specifications to see if it is statistically significant. In 
all cases, the instruments are found to be statistically significant. In the third set of columns (columns (c)), 
we report the second-stage results of the IV model. The results with respect to collateral and maturity are 
qualitatively similar to columns (a). In terms of size, the IV estimates for collateral are very similar to 
those in column (a). As can be observed in Table 7, the IV estimates for the foreign bank dummy in both 
the collateral and maturity regressions are similar to those obtained when ignoring the joint determination 
of loan contract terms (the marginal effect in the collateral equation is 0.321). For the loan spread, the 
foreign bank effect loses its economic and statistical significance, consistent with results from the takeover 
exercise. This indicates that the estimated loan rate discounts of foreign banks are due to the 
systematically different other loan characteristics. 
(Insert Table 7 about here) 
 
                                                
35 See Bharath, et al. (2011) for an extensive discussion on the reasoning behind their choice of instruments in 
relation to the extant theoretical and empirical literature on debt maturity, collateral, and loan interest rates. To 
distinguish between regulated and non-regulated industries in Bolivia we use the Sectoral Regulatory System Law 
(Law 1600) introduced in 1994. 
 
36 Since collateral is a discrete variable, we use the fitted values from a first stage logit equation for collateral as an 
instrument for collateral (see Bharath, et al. (2011) and Wooldridge (2002)). 
 
37 The marginal effect of the foreign bank coefficient in the collateral equation is 0.326, thus similar to the OLS 
estimates. 
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To assess the relevance and validity of our instruments we perform a variety of tests, reported at 
the bottom of Table 7. The two key criteria that an instrument must meet are relevance (instrument is 
correlated with endogenous variable) and validity (instrument affects the dependent variable only through 
the endogenous variable). The first set of tests assesses whether the instruments used are relevant using the 
Cragg-Donald test statistic.38 In all cases, the reported statistics exceed the critical values reported by 
Stock and Yogo (2005), implying that our instruments are relevant. The Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistics 
– another test of relevance – yield similar conclusions.39 Tests of the instrument’s validity can only be 
calculated if the number of instruments is higher than the number of endogenous variables so that the 
system of equations is overidentified. To perform a validity test, we employ two additional instruments. 
We use an indicator variable for sole proprietorship as an additional instrument for collateral as in 
Bellucci, Borisov, Giombini and Zazzaro (2015) and the term spread as an additional instrument for 
maturity as in Bharath, et al. (2011). Results and tests are reported in the fourth column for each contract 
term (columns (d)) and are similar to those obtained earlier in columns (c). In all cases, the Hansen’s J-
statistic fails to reject the null hypothesis, implying that our instruments are relevant and valid.  
All in all, our robustness tests confirm that foreign banks are more likely to require collateral and 
grant loans with shorter maturities even when lending to the same firm in the same month. Differences 
between domestic and foreign bank loans with respect to interest rates are not robust. Unobserved 
heterogeneity on the purpose of the loan and other contract terms are partly driving these differences. 
4.3 Bank ownership and loan pricing 
 
                                                
38 For an IV probit with clustered standard errors there is no corresponding test for weak instruments. A test exists if 
standard errors are not clustered (the Anderson and Rubin (1949) test statistics based on work by Finlay and 
Magnusson (2009)). In unreported specifications, we re-estimate our model without clustering the standard errors 
and perform this test. We obtain a Chi-square=16.08 and p-value=0, rejecting the null that the instrument for 
collateral is weak. 
 
39 We use the Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic (Kleibergen and Paap (2006)), instead of Anderson’s LR statistic used 
in Bharath, et al. (2011), because it is robust to non i.i.d. errors (we cluster standard errors at the firm-level in our 
case).  
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We now turn to the second empirical model to gauge differences between foreign and domestic banks in 
their loan pricing. In particular, Table 8 reports results for the fully interacted model of equation (2). 
Column I shows the estimated coefficients for domestic banks, column II reports the coefficients of the 
interaction terms with the foreign bank dummy (i.e., the difference of foreign banks relative to domestic 
banks), and column III shows the cumulative coefficients for foreign banks. In columns IV-VI and VII-IX, 
we also report the corresponding specifications for smaller and larger firms, respectively.40  
(Insert Table 8 about here) 
The results in Table 8 show significant differences between domestic and foreign banks in the 
pricing of their loans even when lending to the same firm in the same month. The results in columns I to 
III reveal that only foreign banks use credit ratings to price their loans. Specifically, we find that the 
variation in credit ratings is significantly related to the variation in interest rates in the case of foreign but 
not in the case of domestic banks.41 Moreover, as can be observed in columns VI and IX, foreign banks 
use credit ratings mainly for the pricing of their loans to larger firms.42 Domestic banks instead seem to 
base their pricing on the strength of their lending relationship with the firm, particularly for smaller firms. 
As can be observed in column IV, smaller firms with longer relationships above seven months and a 
primary bank status with a domestic bank are charged lower interest rates.43 These effects are less 
pronounced for larger firms. While the coefficient of the primary bank status in column VII remains 
 
                                                
40 As before, smaller and larger firms are defined using the median firm’s total outstanding bank debt as a threshold 
as in Table 3. However, similar results are obtained if we use the 30th and the 70th percentiles instead. 
 
41 As this finding might be due to the lower variation in credit ratings by domestic banks, we re-ran these regressions, 
using a standardized credit rating variable, where each rating is expressed as the difference between the actual rating 
and the originating bank’s average rating divided by the standard deviation in the originating bank’s rating. The 
results using these standardized credit ratings, available on request, confirm our findings.  
 
42 In unreported results, we re-estimate our specifications of equation (2) after replacing the credit ratings with a 
dummy variable indicating whether the firm had observable defaults or repayment problems as in following Berger, 
Frame and Ioannidou (2011). This variable is not found to be statistically significant, suggesting that credit ratings 
contain additional (soft and more forward looking) information about the firm than mere past (non) performance, 
consistent with results in Agarwal and Hauswald (2010). This might be explained by the fact that by looking at a 
sample of firms that get multiple loans from multiple banks in a given month we focus on some of the larger firms in 
the sample. For example, re-estimating the interest rate regression for the entire sample, yields a positive and 
significant coefficient for the past nonperformance variable. 
 
43 The positive coefficient on relationship length and the negative coefficient on its square imply that interest rates 
decrease in relationship length, when Rel Duration is larger than 2.08, corresponding to a relationship length of 7 
months. The negative relationship between relationship length and interest rates turns significant at 26 months.  
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statistically significant, the size of the coefficient is much smaller (in absolute terms) and relationships 
length is not found to matter for larger firms. With the exception of additional products from the bank (Rel 
Scope), which are positively related to interest rates, none of the relationship characteristics is found to 
explain the interest rate variation of foreign bank loans to larger firms in columns VI and IX. Turning to 
other contract terms, we observe that collateral pledges are associated with lower interest rates for larger 
firms in the case of foreign banks, but not in the case of domestic banks. Installment loans are charged 
higher interest rates by both domestic and foreign banks, but only in the case of larger firms. While 
variation in the loan amount is not significantly associated with variation in interest rates, higher maturity 
loans attract lower interest rates, both from domestic and foreign banks.  
Table 9 provides additional insights on the extent to which “hard” or hardened information 
explain variation in the pricing of foreign and domestic bank loans. Following Rajan, et al. (2015), we 
estimate a separate pricing model for foreign and domestic bank loans using credit ratings and collateral as 
the only explanatory variables and compare the resulting R-squares for domestic and foreign bank loans. 
If foreign banks rely mostly on hard or hardened information while domestic banks rely in addition on soft 
information stemming from the depth and breadth of the relationship with borrowers, then credit ratings 
and collateral should explain a higher share of variation in interest rates in the case of foreign than in the 
case of domestic banks. We also estimate this model separately for smaller and larger firms. As can be 
observed in columns I and II of Table 9, ratings and collateral explain about 10% of the interest rate 
variation of foreign bank loans and a mere 2% of the interest rate variation of domestic bank loans. Re-
estimating these models for smaller and larger firms separately confirms these results for both smaller and 
larger firms and shows that the difference in R-squares between foreign and domestic banks is more 
pronounced for larger firms. For smaller firms, the foreign banks’ R-square is about 76 percent higher 
than that of domestic banks, while it is 574 percent higher for larger firms.  
Overall, these findings suggest that hard or hardened information such as credit scores and 
collateral play a much more important role in the pricing of foreign bank loans, particularly for larger 
firms. This is not surprising as larger firms are more likely to have collateral and more information may be 
available on them, allowing foreign banks a more meaningful use of credit scoring models. Nevertheless, 
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as can be observed in Table 9 significant heterogeneity remains consistent with the extant literature on the 
pricing of commercial loans (see, for example, Cerqueiro, Degryse and Ongena (2011)). 
(Insert Table 9 about here) 
All in all, these findings are consistent with our second hypothesis that foreign banks use 
transaction-based technologies, such as credit scoring and asset-based finance that rely on hard or 
hardened information, especially when lending to larger firms. Domestic banks instead engage more in 
relationship lending, especially in the case of smaller firms. These results are consistent with the idea that 
domestic and foreign banks cater to the same customers using different lending technologies that better 
exploit their comparative advantages vis-à-vis their local competitors (as suggested, among others, by 
Berger and Udell (2006); De la Torre, et al. (2010); Sengupta (2007)). Our findings also highlight the need 
to control for differences in the clienteles of domestic and foreign banks as the use of different lending 
technologies for firms of different size could produce similar but misleading results.  
4.4 What drives distance-related information constraints? 
In this section, we present additional results exploiting cross-sectional variation on distance constraints 
using a bank’s mode of entry in Bolivia and time since entry or since becoming foreign owned. These 
results help shed light on the possible sources of distance constraints of foreign banks and are related to 
our third hypothesis stated in the Introduction that the use of contract terms to overcome information 
asymmetries should increase in the distance within the bank or between the bank and the borrower.  
We first distinguish foreign banks into branches and subsidiaries. During the sample period, 
Bolivia had four foreign branches and three foreign subsidiaries. All else equal, we expect distance-related 
information constraints to be more pronounced for foreign branches than foreign subsidiaries. Branches 
are integral parts of their parent company, while subsidiaries are separate legal entities with greater 
operational autonomy from their parent companies. Hence, while in the case of subsidiaries most lending 
decisions may be delegated to local management, in the case of branches, it is likely that there will be 
more centralization resulting in greater geographical and organizational distance and greater reliance on 
“hard” information (see, among others e.g., Aghion and Tirole (1997); Mian (2006); Skrastins and Vig 
(2014); Stein (2002)). Information asymmetries are also expected to be stronger for branches of foreign 
 29 
banks than subsidiaries. Subsidiaries are former domestic banks that may have better knowledge of the 
country (local economy, corporate culture, legal framework, and institutions) than branches of foreign 
multinational banks.44 We thus expect that the differences between domestic and foreign banks in their 
lending technologies are more pronounced for foreign branches than for foreign subsidiaries.45 
To investigate this possibility, in Table 10, Panel A we re-estimate a slightly modified version of 
equation (1), in which the foreign bank dummy is split into its two components and the sample is 
restricted to firms that obtained at least one loan from a domestic bank, a foreign subsidiary, and a foreign 
branch in the same month. The resulting sample includes 689 loans to 30 unique firms. Consistent with 
our expectations we find that the differences documented earlier between domestic and foreign banks with 
respect to collateral and maturity are more pronounced for foreign branches than foreign subsidiaries. 
Results with respect to maturity are contrary to expectations. We find that while foreign subsidiaries have 
shorter maturity loans relative to domestic banks, foreign branches do not. Given the small sample in 
Panel A, in Panel B we relax the restriction that firms must be borrowing from all three types of banks in 
the same month and consider a sample of firms borrowing from the three types of banks at any point 
during the sample period, resulting in a sample of 7,040 loans to 117 firms. Firm-month fixed effects are 
thus replaced with firm and time fixed effects. Results are similar to those in Panel A. 
(Insert Table 10 about here) 
Overall, the results in Panels A and B indicate that while differences between domestic and 
foreign banks with respect to collateral and interest rates are more pronounced for foreign branches rather 
than foreign subsidiaries as expected. The opposite, however, seems to hold for maturity. This is puzzling 
as theory offers no guidance as to why collateral or maturity may be used differentially by foreign 
branches and subsidiaries. Results in Panel C indicated that failing to account for time since entry or since 
becoming foreign owned, may confound comparisons between branches and subsidiaries. In Panel C we 
 
                                                
44 See, among others, Bruno and Hauswald (2014), Claessens and van Horen (2014), Giannetti and Yafeh (2012), 
Gormley (2014), and Mian (2006). 
 
45 The literature also suggests that branches and subsidiaries follow different business models. As discussed in 
Cerutti, Dell'Ariccia and Martínez Pería (2007) foreign branches are smaller operations focusing on small segments 
of the overall market such as wholesale operations and investment banking, with less focus on retail operations. 
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allow for interactions between foreign branches and foreign subsidiaries with time since entry and time 
since becoming foreign owned. The impact of time on these two types of foreign banks may be very 
different. Branches may become more like domestic banks as time since entry passes and become more 
accustomed with the local economy, its culture, and institutions (i.e., informational disadvantages vis-à-vis 
the domestic banks may decrease over time). Subsidiaries instead may become more like foreign banks as 
time passes. All else equal, the takeover increases the geographical and organizational distance between 
loan officers and the bank’s headquarters. After the takeover, foreign banks may thus begin adjusting their 
lending policies to their new structure, becoming more like foreign banks as time passes. 
Results in Panel C confirm these predictions. 46 We find that as time since entry increases, foreign 
branches become more like domestic banks. In particular, while foreign branches are more likely to 
require collateral and lend at shorter maturities than domestic banks, these differences become less 
pronounced as time since entry increases. In terms of economic significance, a one standard-deviation 
increase in time since entry (by 1.85 years) from the mean is associated with a 6 percentage points 
decrease in the relative likelihood of collateral and a 52 percent decrease in the maturity differential. 
Foreign subsidiaries instead begin to behave more like foreign banks, as time since becoming foreign 
owned increases. They begin to require more collateral and lend at shorter maturities as time passes. A one 
standard deviation increase in the time since becoming foreign owned (by 2.17 years) from the mean, is 
associated with a 13 percentage point increase in the relative likelihood of collateral and a 50 percent 
increase in the maturity differential by around 2 months. Interestingly, the directions and economic 
magnitudes of these effects are similar to those documented in Table 5 for the takeover of the former 
domestic bank from foreign investors. Consistent with the more frequent use of collateral and short 
maturities, the foreign bank loan rate discounts are found to increase over time. All in all, the results in 
Panel C suggest that differences between domestic and foreign banks with respect to collateral and 
maturity may relate to informational disadvantages arising from greater geographical and organizational 
 
                                                
46 We re-estimate equation (1) allowing for interactions with time since entry or time since becoming foreign owned, 
defined as the natural logarithm of the number of years between the date of loan origination and the date the bank 
entered Bolivia or became foreign owned. We estimate this specification using the larger sample in Panel B, as we 
do not have sufficient variation for the restricted sample of 689 loans of Panel A. 
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distances. These findings are also not consistent with the “bank-fixed hypothesis”, discussed in section 
4.2, as the latter would imply time-invariant differences between domestic and foreign banks.  
In the final part of Table 10 we also explore available variation in geographical and organizational 
distances. We re-estimate the specifications in Panel B allowing for interactions with Non-Local, a 
dummy variable that indicates whether the bank’s headquarters are in a different location (region or 
country) than where the loan is originated.47 This variable intends to capture greater geographical and 
organizational distances between loan origination and the bank’s headquarters. The omitted group in these 
specifications is local domestic banks as Non-Local is also included in the regressions.48 Foreign 
Branches is not interacted with Non-Local as in all cases foreign branches have their headquarters outside 
Bolivia. Domestic banks and foreign subsidiaries can be either local or non-local depending on whether 
the loan was originated in the region whether the bank is headquartered. The results in Panel D confirm 
our previous findings in Panels A and B relative to local domestic banks and additionally indicate that 
differences in maturities between local domestic banks and foreign subsidiaries become more pronounced 
as geographical distance increases. As before, collateral seems to play a more important role for foreign 
branches (i.e., a non-local foreign branch is 44.4 percentage points more likely to have collateral relative 
to a domestic local bank; a non-local foreign subsidiary is only 11.4 percent points more likely). 
Interestingly, geographical distance seems to make no difference in the relative use of collateral and 
maturity for domestic banks. Overall, the findings reported in this section are consistent with our third 
hypothesis that the use of contract terms such as collateral and maturity to overcome information frictions 
is associated with greater geographical and organizational distances.  
4.5 Bank ownership and ex post loan performance 
 
                                                
47 While we know the precise location of a bank’s headquarters we do not know the precise location of the branch 
that originates each loan or the precise location of each firm. We can only observe the region in which each loan is 
originated. The data availability does not allow us to study differences due to special price discrimination emanating 
from transportation costs and market power as in Agarwal and Hauswald (2010) and Degryse and Ongena (2005). 
 
48 Foreign Branch is not interacted with Non-Local as all loans originated by foreign branches are non-local as 
foreign branches have the headquarters are outside Bolivia. Domestic banks and foreign subsidiaries can be either 
local or non-local depending on whether the loan was originated in the region whether the bank is headquartered. 
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In this final section, we compare the ex post performance of domestic and foreign bank loans. If foreign 
and domestic banks set loan conditions and price loans in an optimal way, we should not observe any 
systematic differences in the ex post performance of their loans, especially when holding differences in 
their clienteles fixed. We study two measures of ex post loan performance: arrears or defaults and net 
return on loans and present OLS regressions that compare the ex post performance of loans originated by 
domestic and foreign banks to the same firm in the same month for all loans in our sample, for secured and 
unsecured loans separately, for loans with maturities below and above the sample median, and for secured 
and unsecured loans each with shorter and longer maturities.  
First, we define a dummy variable, Arrears or Default, that equals one if a loan is in arrears for 
more than 30 days or if it is downgraded to the default status (rating 5), and equals zero otherwise. 
Regressions in Panel A of Table 11 show that loans originated by foreign banks to the same firm in the 
same month are 3.5 percentage points more likely to go in arrears or default, consistent with foreign banks 
facing higher agency conflicts. This finding is driven by unsecured and longer maturity loans.49 In 
particular, we find no significant differences in repayment for secured and for short-term loans; significant 
differences are only found for unsecured and for long-term loans. When splitting the sample in two ways, 
the higher incidence of repayment problems for foreign bank loans is only confirmed for loans that are 
both unsecured and of longer maturity. The results thus suggest that foreign banks are able to effectively 
mitigate credit risk problems using collateral and shorter maturities. In unreported robustness checks, we 
also confirm these results with descriptive statistics or corresponding specifications with firm fixed effects 
(instead of firm×time fixed effects) to alleviate possible concerns that insignificant differences in some 
sub-samples are due to exhaustive fixed effects saturating variation.  
(Insert Table 11 around here) 
While foreign banks seem to experience higher arrears or defaults when they lend without 
collateral and at longer maturities, they still might be able to recover loans later on. Hence, we also 
compute the bank’s net returns on each loan. Given the systematic differences in contract characteristics 
between domestic and foreign bank loans and differences in funding costs between domestic and foreign 
 
                                                
49 Note that results also hold when we include control variables as in previous regressions as well as the interest rate. 
 33 
banks, the bank’s net return on loans provides a more comprehensive measure of loan performance. 
Following Haselmann, Schoenherr and Vig (2016) and Skrastins and Vig (2014) we define the gross 
return on a loan (ROL) to firm i from bank j for the entire loan spell as:  
 
where the first term stands for the ratio of the outstanding loan amount to firm i from bank j at the 
beginning of period t (LoanBalanceijt) to the sum of the outstanding loan amounts over the loan spell. The 
indicator function equals one when a loan has overdue payments between t and t+1, rijt is the interest rate 
on the loan, and Lossijt is the loss of the bank. We calculate the loss of the bank as the written-off amount 
or the overdue amount over the contract amount. The weights ensure that returns or defaults at the 
beginning of the loan spell receive more weight than those at the end of the loan spell when most of the 
loan has been repaid. To account for funding costs differences between domestic and foreign banks, we 
further subtract from the ROL each bank’s cost of deposits at loan origination. We refer to this as the Net 
Return on Loans and use it as our main measure of returns on loans in Panel B.  
The results in Panel B show that on average foreign banks have 1.26 percentage points lower net 
returns on their loans than domestic banks.50 This is a more pronounced for unsecured loans (1.73 
percentage points) as opposed to secured loans (insignificant) and for longer maturity (1.69 percentage 
points) than shorter maturity loans (0.82 percentage points). When splitting the sample, we find no 
significant difference in their net returns on loans that are both secured and of short maturity and the 
highest difference for loans that are both unsecured and of longer maturity (2.06 percentage points). In 
unreported robustness checks, we also confirm the results in Panel B using alternatively the gross return 
on loan (ROL) or a gross return on loans using discounted weights as in Haselmann, et al. (2013).51 
In summary, we find that foreign banks have a higher incidence of arrears or defaults and lower 
returns on their loans than domestic banks, consistent with foreign banks being at an informational 
disadvantage relative to domestic banks, even when lending to the same firm at the same time. While 
 
                                                
50 Notice that the number of observations reduces form 5,137 to 5,102 due to missing values for bank funding costs. 
51 Haselmann, et al. (2013) discount the weights in equation (3) to account for the time value of money. 
lending does not lead to higher default rates, lower recovery rates or higher losses at the
end of the loan spell, despite a higher likelihood of arrears during the loan spell.
While Relationship Banks do not experience higher defaults, losses and lower recovery
rates thanMixed Banks for SME loans, it still might be that they are earning lower returns
on loans (ROL). Following Haselmann, Schoenherr, and Vig (2013), I calculate the return
on a loan by bank j to firm i for the entire loan spell:
ROLij =
TX
t=1
LoanBalanceijtPT
t=1 LoanBalanceijt
⇥
(1  1{NPL=1})rijt + 1{NPL=1}Lossijt
⇤
, (2)
ROLij =
TX
t=1
LoanBalanceijtPT
t=1 LoanBalanceijt
⇥
(1  1{NPL=1})rijt + 1{NPL=1}Lossijt
⇤
, (3)
where the first term stands for the ratio of the outstanding loan amount from bank j to
firm i at the beginning of period t (LoanBalanceijt) to the sum of the outstanding loan
amounts over the loan spell (
PT
t=1 LoanBalanceijt). The indicator function equals one
when a loan has overdue amounts between t and t+1, rijt is the interest rate charged by
bank j to firm i and Lossijt is the loss of the bank, which is defined as the (negative)
of the written o↵ amount over the contract amount. The weights ensure that returns or
defaults receive more weight at the beginning of the loan spell and less weight at the end
of the loan spell, when most of the loan has been repaid.
The data allows me to observe the loan balance and overdue principal and interest
amounts if a loan enters a loss/written-o↵ status. However, I do not know whether banks
write-o↵ amounts once a loan goes in arrears. Therefore, I experiment with di↵erent
measures for the loss of the bank to calculate the return on a loan: (i) overdue principal
(plus overdue interest) amount over the contract amount in case a loan is in a loss/written-
o↵ amount and zero in case a loan is just in arrears and (ii) overdue principal (plus overdue
interest) amount over the contract amount in case a loan is in a loss/written-o↵ amount
or in arrears. Since the both measures yield virtually the same results we focus on the
second one which has a broader coverage of potential losses [Put the first one in
footnot since virtually the sam ].
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these findings are not consistent with our fourth hypothesis, we also find that collateral and maturity help 
foreign banks overcome these problems.52 The differences in loan performance are confirmed when we 
consider nonperforming loans (NPL) ratios from banks’ balance sheets.  Domestic and foreign-owned 
banks show economically and statistically significant differences in their NPL ratios. Specifically, foreign 
banks have an average NPL to total loans ratio of 17.8 percent as opposed to 11.3 percent for domestic 
banks, underlining the limitations that distance constraints impose on foreign banks in less developed 
financial markets such as Bolivia.  
4.6 Additional Robustness tests 
In this section we explore the potential role of selection biases, competition effects, and bank size on our 
results. To evaluate differences in the contract terms of domestic and foreign bank loans, our identification 
strategy uses within firm-time variation by comparing the contract terms of domestic and foreign banks 
when lending to the same firm in the same month. The advantage of our identification strategy is that it 
allows us to control for differences in the clientele of domestic and foreign banks and thus avoid cherry 
picking and home bias concerns. The disadvantage is that our estimates are only based on a sub-sample of 
firms: those with multiple bank-lending relationships that receive multiple loans within a given month. 
Clearly such firms are not a random draw of the population: they are the largest firms. This creates 
selection concerns. There could also be concerns about possible competition effects. Since these firms can 
more easily turn to one of their existing lenders for credit, they may be able to play one bank against each 
other for better terms. To study the potential role of such factors we perform several robustness tests.   
First, we re-estimate equation (1) using either all loans in the sample (“universe”). This allows us to 
study whether our key findings in Tables 3 and 4 also hold for the larger population of loans and firms in 
Bolivia. Admittedly, identification in this case is less clean as the firm×time fixed effects are replaced 
with firm and time fixed effects. As can be observed in Table 12 (Panel A), results for the “universe” are 
 
                                                
52 This result is similar to findings in Agarwal and Hauswald (2010) that relying primarily on soft information only 
reduces arrear incidence in the case of low distance but not high distance between borrowers and banks. The findings 
are also consistent with DeYoung, Glennon and Nigro (2008) that while defaults on small business loans in rural 
United States increase in distance between borrower and banks, the use of hard-information tools such as credit 
scoring dampens this effect substantially.  
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qualitatively and quantitatively similar to those reported in Tables 3 and 4 for our sub-sample. (Table 12 
reports specifications corresponding to those reported in columns III and VIII of Table 3 and column III of 
Table 4.) Overall, these results confirm that our findings are relevant beyond our limited and selective 
sample of firms with access to both domestic and foreign banks at the same time. 
(Insert Table 12 here) 
The “universe” includes both multiple and single relationship firms and thus can help assuage 
concerns that our findings are picking up a peculiarity of multiple relationship firms. Nevertheless, as an 
additional robustness test, we re-estimate equation (1) using loans to firms with single bank lending 
relationships throughout the sample period. Relative to firms in “our sample”, such firms may have more 
difficulties to access credit from other banks. They may thus not be able to benefit from competition 
across banks. As can be observed in Panel B, results with respect to collateral and maturity are similar to 
those presented in Tables 3 and 4 for “our sample”. With respect to loan interest rates, we find 
significantly smaller interest rate discounts that are not statistically significant. This suggests that while 
firms with multiple bank lending relationships may be compensated with lower interest rates for worse 
other loan conditions, single relationship firms with fewer alternatives are not. This is consistent with the 
theoretical predictions in Sengupta (2007) and mirrors results in Agarwal and Hauswald (2010) and 
Ioannidou and Ongena (2010) on hold-up rents in bank-lending relationships when competition is low. 
To further examine the potential role of competition effects in “our sample”, in Panels C-E we 
examine whether there is any systematic pattern in the order in which firms obtain loans from domestic 
and foreign banks and whether results are sensitive to any such ordering. This could be informative as to 
whether firms use first one type of banks for their funding needs, and another for their remaining needs. 
For the 5,137 loans in our sample, we find that in 2,330 cases the domestic bank was first, in 2,417 cases 
the foreign bank was first, and in 390 cases the foreign and domestic banks granted the loans on exactly 
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the same day.53 Re-estimating equation (1) for these three sub-samples yields results that are similar to 
those in Tables 3 and 4 and detects no statistically significant differences between them.  
All in all, our results in Table 12 indicate that our key findings on collateral and maturity are not 
only relevant for our limited and selective sample of firms with access to both domestic and foreign banks 
at the same time, but hold for all firms. Access to multiple banks seems however to affect the loan 
conditionality that firms may be able to obtain: while firms with multiple banks are compensated with 
lower interest rates for the worse other loan conditions, single relationship firms are not. 
In a final robustness test, we show that systematic differences in the average global or local size of 
domestic and foreign banks do not explain our key findings with respect to collateral and maturity. As 
shown in Table 1, most foreign banks are much larger in size than most domestic banks. Differences in 
global bank size may correlate with more hierarchical organizational structures, but also better access to 
capital markets. To investigate this possibility, we add global bank size measured as the natural logarithm 
of consolidated total assets as an additional control variable in equation (1). Results are presented in 
columns of Table 13. We find that in the collateral and interest rate regressions, global bank size produces 
similar results as foreign ownership, suggesting that global bank size maybe part of the reason foreign 
banks behave differently. Relative to earlier estimates, some of the differences between domestic and 
foreign banks are marginally absorbed by differences in bank size. Nevertheless, in all specifications, the 
coefficients of Foreign Bank retain their signs and statistical significance, suggesting that differences 
between domestic and foreign banks go beyond mere differences in size.54  
(Insert Table 13 about here) 
 
                                                
53 Loans originated on the same day could also be part of informal syndicates and could explain some of the observed 
differences in the loan contract terms between domestic and foreign bank loans if domestic and foreign banks were 
more or less likely to engage in such informal syndicates. 
 
54 One concern with these results is that there is almost no overlap in the distribution of global bank size between 
foreign and domestic banks. Hence, in unreported regressions available on request, we re-estimate the specifications 
in Table 13 using a sub-sample of domestic and foreign banks in which the two groups are not significantly different 
in size. In particular, we exclude the four largest foreign banks (Citibank, ABN Amro, Banco do Brasil, and Banco 
de la Nacion Argentina) or the three largest banks (i.e., Citibank, ABN Amro, and Banco do Brasil) and the two 
smallest domestic banks (i.e., Banco Ganadero and Banco Economico). Results in both cases remain unchanged. 
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In Panel B we perform a similar exercise using bank size measured at a local level (i.e., total assets 
in Bolivia). While some foreign banks are large international organizations, their operations in Bolivia 
constitute a miniscule part of their global operations, which may explain why they are disadvantaged 
relative to domestic banks. As can be observed in Panel B this does not explain our key findings with 
respect to collateral and maturity. While as before, bank size enters significantly in some though not all 
regressions, its inclusion in the specification does not affect the size or the statistical significance of the 
foreign bank coefficients. The coefficient of bank size indicates that loans from larger banks are less likely 
to have collateral and have shorter maturities. We find no differences in loan interest rates.  
5. Conclusions 
With the increase of the worldwide globalization of financial markets, the assessment of foreign bank 
entry and presence has become an important question for researchers and policymakers alike. The effects 
of foreign bank participation are not only important for the development of the banking sector in a country 
but will also have real effects on the economy as a whole, especially in countries with bank-finance 
dependent firms. Most country-level and cross-country studies confirm that foreign banks tend to lend to 
large and transparent firms and thus “cherry-pick” clients, leaving the difficult firms to domestic banks. 
Fewer studies find that foreign and large banks engage in lending to both smaller and larger firms.  
Our findings suggest that foreign banks use contract design and other assessment mechanisms as a 
way to overcome their informational disadvantages vis-à-vis their local competitors, with both types of 
lenders co-existing in equilibrium. Holding differences in borrower clienteles constant, we find that 
foreign banks use collateral, maturity, and credit scoring models to overcome distance constraints 
emanating from their size and steeper organizational structures and show that such mechanisms are 
effective in terms of ex post loan performance. Such mechanisms however may carry important 
limitations. If domestic lenders cannot cover the remaining segments of the market, the foreign banks’ 
stronger reliance on collateral and short maturity loans may reduce the options for firm investment. It may 
also have important repercussions from a capital allocation perspective as it may imply a shift towards 
firms with short-term financing needs and with pledgeable assets both on the intensive and extensive 
margin, limiting the potentially beneficial role foreign banks can play in developing countries.   
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Table 1: Summary Statistics for Commercial Banks Operating in Bolivia 
The table provides summary statistics for all commercial banks that were active in Bolivia between March 1999 and December 2003.We distinguish between foreign branches, 
foreign subsidiaries and domestic banks. A bank is considered to be foreign if more that 50% of its shares are foreign-owned. Entry/ Acquisition indicates at which point in time the 
bank entered the market or was acquired by a foreign bank. Consolidated Total Assets reports the average value of banks’ total assets globally in millions of US$ during the sample 
period. Total Assets in Bolivia reports the average value of bank’s total assets in Bolivia in millions of US$ during the sample period. Market Share stands for a bank’s total loans 
in the country to the total loans in the country per month. Cost of Deposits stands for the average interest rate on dollar deposits in a month. 
Bank Entry/
Acquisition Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev
Foreign Branches
Citibank* 01/01/66 975134.000 198429.000 262.180 39.732 0.069 0.024 3.034 1.634
ABN Amro* 07/08/98 530089.000 48568.000 22.342 2.741 0.014 0.007 4.721 0.454
Banco do Brasil* 07/01/61 76124.000 16741.000 32.615 9.776 0.018 0.012 3.938 1.324
Banco de la Nación Argentina* 04/28/58 14614.171 4031.653 28.024 6.983 0.016 0.012 5.320 1.361
Foreign Subsidiaries
Banco Santa Cruz 07/17/98 833.479 354.155 830.479 303.146 0.105 0.044 3.003 1.686
Banco de Crédito de Bolivia 12/30/92 589.057 97.402 590.053 96.841 0.161 0.053 4.245 1.438
Banco Solidario 03/15/99 94.936 6.970 94.936 6.970 0.004 0.002 5.509 1.850
Domestic
Banco Industrial 682.490 48.450 682.490 48.450 0.263 0.054 4.021 1.366
Banco Nacional de Bolivia 621.065 17.808 621.065 17.808 0.118 0.047 5.037 1.434
Banco Mercantil 598.895 31.616 598.895 31.616 0.108 0.038 4.691 1.514
Banco de la Unión 443.784 90.026 443.784 90.026 0.060 0.027 5.886 1.766
Banco Económico 284.716 36.613 284.716 36.613 0.039 0.020 6.265 1.503
Banco Ganadero 207.390 21.950 207.390 21.950 0.046 0.016 5.586 1.599
Consolitated Total Assets Cost of DepositsMarket ShareTotal Assets in Bolivia
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Table 2: Summary Statistics 
The table reports summary statistics for the entire sample of 32,279 loans to 2,672 unique firms, referred to as “Universe”, during the sample period. Summary statistics are also 
provided separately for loans originated by foreign and domestic banks. All variables are defined in Table A1 in the Appendix. The stars next to the mean values of domestic bank 
loans under “Universe” indicate whether the differences between domestic and foreign banks are statistically significant using the t-test. The second part of the table “Our Sample”, 
reports summary statistics for a sub-sample of 5,137 loans to 287 firms that borrow from both domestic and foreign banks in the same month and compares it to the “Universe”. 
Statistics are provided for all loans in “Our Sample” as well as for foreign and domestic banks separately. The stars next to each mean value indicate whether it is statistically 
different from its corresponding value for the “Universe” using a sample adjusted t-test. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Variable Names
Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. St. Dev. St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev.
Loan Terms
Installment 0.470 0.499 0.500 0.500 0.450 *** 0.498 0.461 0.499 0.482 0.500 0.437 0.496
Amount 161,908 468,898 204,725 564,162 134,714 *** 394,297 251,098 *** 524,793 239,967 *** 436,543 263,231 *** 606,387
Collateral 0.245 0.430 0.376 0.484 0.161 *** 0.368 0.331 *** 0.470 0.461 *** 0.499 0.188 *** 0.391
Maturity 10.859 16.272 8.304 10.926 12.481 *** 18.717 8.817 *** 11.211 7.049 *** 7.382 10.744 *** 14.007
Interest Rate 13.448 2.887 13.041 3.020 13.706 *** 2.769 12.617 *** 2.951 12.203 *** 2.863 13.069 ** 2.979
Loan Spread 9.949 2.763 9.352 2.990 10.328 *** 2.537 9.155 *** 2.594 8.774 *** 2.654 9.570 2.460
Legal Structure
Sole Proprietorship 0.125 0.331 0.096 0.295 0.144 *** 0.351 0.046 *** 0.210 0.034 *** 0.180 0.060 *** 0.237
General Partnership 0.009 0.096 0.005 0.073 0.012 *** 0.108 0.005 *** 0.070 0.001 *** 0.039 0.009 * 0.092
Limited Partnership 0.130 0.337 0.139 0.346 0.125 *** 0.331 0.147 *** 0.354 0.166 *** 0.373 0.125 0.331
Joint Stock Company 0.229 0.420 0.273 0.446 0.201 *** 0.401 0.358 *** 0.479 0.381 *** 0.486 0.332 *** 0.471
Limited Liability Company 0.486 0.500 0.472 0.499 0.494 *** 0.500 0.428 *** 0.495 0.411 *** 0.492 0.446 *** 0.497
Other 0.020 0.142 0.014 0.118 0.025 *** 0.155 0.017 ** 0.128 0.006 *** 0.077 0.028 0.166
Bank Debt
Outstanding Debt 1,991,796 3,879,224 2,410,193 4,194,117 1,726,061 *** 3,640,433 5,452,792 *** 6,474,100 5,146,245 *** 6,395,487 5,786,901 *** 6,543,670
Credit Quality
Past Non-Performance 0.209 0.407 0.246 0.431 0.186 *** 0.389 0.304 *** 0.460 0.284 *** 0.451 0.325 *** 0.468
Rating 1 0.873 0.332 0.860 0.347 0.882 *** 0.323 0.857 0.350 0.815 *** 0.388 0.903 0.296
Rating 2 0.098 0.298 0.096 0.295 0.100 0.299 0.119 *** 0.324 0.150 *** 0.357 0.085 *** 0.279
Rating 3 0.024 0.154 0.035 0.185 0.017 *** 0.130 0.023 0.150 0.033 0.179 0.012 ** 0.110
Rating 4 0.004 0.063 0.008 0.091 0.001 *** 0.036 0.001 *** 0.028 0.001 *** 0.039 0 *** 0
Relationship Characteristics
Multiple Relationships 0.555 0.497 0.620 0.485 0.514 *** 0.500 1 0 1 0 1 0
Rel Duration 22.079 16.065 20.840 15.272 22.866 *** 16.500 23.071 *** 16.354 23.407 *** 16.543 22.705 16.142
Scope 0.259 0.438 0.224 0.417 0.281 *** 0.450 0.255 0.436 0.206 ** 0.404 0.310 *** 0.462
Primary 0.714 0.452 0.665 0.472 0.744 *** 0.436 0.283 *** 0.451 0.312 *** 0.464 0.252 *** 0.434
Observations 32,279 19,74112,538
Sample
Mean
Domestic
Mean 
5,137 2,679 2,458
All Foreign DomesticAll Foreign
Universe
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Table 3: Determinants of Collateral and Maturity 
The table reports OLS regressions for a sample of 5,137 loans to 287 firms that received a new loan from at least one foreign and one domestic bank in the same month during the 
period March 1999 to December 2003. The dependent variables are Collateral, a dummy variable indicating whether the loan contract includes the pledge of collateral and Maturity, 
the natural logarithm of one plus the number of months between loan origination and maturity. Columns I-V (VI-X) report regression results for Collateral (Maturity) as the 
dependent variable, with different control variables and for smaller and larger firms separately. Columns IV-V and IX-X report regression results for collateral and maturity for sub-
samples of firms with outstanding bank debt below or above the sample median, denoted as Smaller Firms and Larger Firms, respectively. Definitions of all variables can be found 
in Table A1 in the Appendix. Standard errors (presented in parentheses) are clustered at firm level. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.  
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X
Smaller Firms Larger Firms Smaller Firms Larger Firms
Bank Characteristics
Foreign Bank 0.265*** 0.272*** 0.277*** 0.325*** 0.263*** -0.188*** -0.191*** -0.266*** -0.252*** -0.269***
(0.041) (0.038) (0.039) (0.055) (0.047) (0.046) (0.043) (0.042) (0.075) (0.049)
Firm Characteristics
Rating 2 0.154*** 0.139** 0.185 0.126** -0.016 -0.023 -0.046 -0.026
(0.059) (0.059) (0.122) (0.063) (0.134) (0.094) (0.168) (0.108)
Ratings 3 & 4 -0.167* -0.182* -0.081 -0.225** 0.008 -0.207 0.081 -0.318
(0.090) (0.097) (0.193) (0.114) (0.246) (0.186) (0.391) (0.194)
Relationship Characteristics
Rel Duration -0.094*** -0.094*** -0.036 -0.122*** -0.231** -0.174 -0.130 -0.186
(0.027) (0.026) (0.044) (0.031) (0.113) (0.121) (0.184) (0.148)
Rel Duration-Square 0.047* 0.037 0.036 0.036
(0.027) (0.032) (0.049) (0.038)
Rel Scope -0.059 -0.058 0.073 -0.083* -0.015 -0.117** -0.159 -0.105*
(0.044) (0.044) (0.076) (0.049) (0.066) (0.054) (0.110) (0.061)
Primary Bank -0.118*** -0.123*** -0.132** -0.121*** 0.222*** 0.121*** 0.187*** 0.082
(0.036) (0.034) (0.058) (0.043) (0.059) (0.043) (0.071) (0.053)
Other Contract Terms
Installment -0.049 -0.057 -0.050 0.846*** 0.977*** 0.812***
(0.041) (0.055) (0.047) (0.075) (0.109) (0.088)
Loan Amount 0.028** 0.064** 0.023 0.063** 0.103** 0.057**
(0.013) (0.025) (0.014) (0.025) (0.048) (0.028)
Constant 0.192*** 0.493*** 0.200 -0.365 0.354* 2.059*** 2.243*** 1.155*** 0.499 1.303***
(0.021) (0.078) (0.165) (0.280) (0.182) (0.024) (0.118) (0.314) (0.589) (0.355)
Fixed Effects
Firm×Time Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
R-squared 0.508 0.537 0.540 0.640 0.519 0.447 0.459 0.632 0.701 0.613
Observations 5,137 5,137 5,137 1,129 4,008 5,137 5,137 5,137 1,129 4,008
All Firms All Firms
Collateral Maturity
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Table 4: Determinants of Loan Interest Rate 
The table reports OLS regressions for a sample of 5,137 loans to 287 firms that received a new loan from at least one foreign and one domestic bank in the same month during the 
period March 1999 to December 2003. The dependent variable is Loan Spread, the loan interest rate minus the rate on US Treasury securities of comparable maturity at loan 
origination. Columns I-III report regression results with different control variables. Columns IV-V report regression results with all control variables, where the sample is divided 
between firms with outstanding bank debt below or above the sample median, denoted as Smaller Firms and Larger Firms, respectively. Columns VI-X report augmented 
specifications of those presented in Columns I-V where bank funding costs and market shares are added among the control variables. The definitions of all variables can be found in 
Table A1 in the Appendix. Standard errors (presented in parentheses) are clustered at firm level. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X
Smaller Firms Larger Firms Smaller Firms Larger Firms
Bank Characteristics
Foreign Bank -0.887*** -0.893*** -1.068*** -0.961*** -1.126*** -0.689*** -0.729*** -0.987*** -0.692** -1.101***
(0.134) (0.135) (0.147) (0.280) (0.168) (0.179) (0.173) (0.171) (0.343) (0.193)
Cost of Deposits (%) 0.107 0.082 0.064 0.185 0.045
(0.076) (0.072) (0.060) (0.136) (0.067)
Market Share 1.499 1.556 -0.201 2.309 -1.012
(0.954) (0.965) (0.986) (1.742) (1.133)
Firm Characteristics
Rating 2 0.468* 0.513** 0.067 0.632** 0.500* 0.511** 0.138 0.623** 
(0.268) (0.241) (0.485) (0.256) (0.264) (0.244) (0.487) (0.263)
Ratings 3 & 4 0.831 0.661 -0.429 1.099** 0.824 0.668 -0.411 1.118*  
(0.650) (0.544) (1.284) (0.551) (0.638) (0.556) (1.291) (0.568)
Relationship Characteristics
Rel Duration 0.393 0.119 1.270** -0.337 0.365 0.112 1.253** -0.351
(0.291) (0.243) (0.596) (0.255) (0.291) (0.246) (0.583) (0.256)
Rel Duration-Square -0.096 -0.046 -0.307* 0.049 -0.089 -0.041 -0.299* 0.058
(0.071) (0.061) (0.157) (0.063) (0.071) (0.062) (0.154) (0.063)
Rel Scope 0.223 0.121 0.209 0.103 0.139 0.138 0.140 0.163
(0.194) (0.163) (0.342) (0.178) (0.191) (0.158) (0.335) (0.176)
Primary Bank -0.491*** -0.326** -0.614** -0.147 -0.484*** -0.309** -0.579** -0.127
(0.153) (0.137) (0.259) (0.162) (0.153) (0.137) (0.242) (0.164)
Other Contract Terms
Installment 0.542*** 0.347 0.569*** 0.519*** 0.369 0.547***
(0.149) (0.376) (0.159) (0.151) (0.367) (0.162)
Loan Amount 0.017 0.094 0.003 0.021 0.078 0.012
(0.098) (0.115) (0.108) (0.101) (0.116) (0.111)
Collateral -0.371** -0.133 -0.428** -0.393** -0.110 -0.467** 
(0.162) (0.265) (0.181) (0.161) (0.276) (0.184)
Maturity -1.191*** -1.213*** -1.164*** -1.188*** -1.172*** -1.170***
(0.133) (0.187) (0.160) (0.134) (0.190) (0.160)
Constant 9.617*** 9.365*** 11.783*** 11.299*** 12.010*** 8.852*** 8.749*** 11.432*** 10.070*** 11.833***
(0.070) (0.280) (0.954) (1.397) (1.038) (0.445) (0.468) (1.046) (1.779) (1.140)
Fixed Effects
Firm×Time Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
R-squared 0.671 0.678 0.731 0.734 0.718 0.673 0.680 0.731 0.737 0.719
Observations 5,137 5,137 5,137 1,129 4,008 5,131 5,131 5,131 1,126 4,005
All Firms All Firms
Benchmark Specifications Funding Costs & Market Share
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Table 5: Changes in Contract Terms after a Foreign Bank Takeover  
The table reports the changes in the contract terms of a domestic bank, Banco Boliviano Americano (BBA), after it has been 
taken over by a foreign bank, Banco Credito de Bolivia (BCR), in May 1999 using a difference-in-difference analysis. To 
determine how contract terms change once the bank is taken over, we use a constant sample of firms that borrow from the 
acquired bank both before and after the takeover as well as other non-taken-over banks. In particular, we identify all loans 
from BBA in the year prior to the merger. We then trace any loans that these firms received from BCR in the three years 
following the acquisition, dropping all loans to firms that were already customers of BCR prior to the acquisition. We refer 
to these as the treated group. To control for changes in the macroeconomic conditions and the banking system over the 
comparison period, we use loans to the same firms by their other (non-taken-over) banks before and after the acquisition. 
We refer to these as the control group. Collateral is a dummy variable indicating whether the loan contract includes the 
pledge of collateral. Maturity is the natural logarithm of one plus the number of months between loan origination and 
maturity and Loan Spread is the loan interest rate minus the rate on US Treasury securities of comparable maturity at loan 
origination. Treatedijkt is a dummy variable that equals one for all loans in the treated group, and equals zero for all loans in 
the control group. Aftert equals one for loans originated after May 1999, and equals zero for loans originated prior. All other 
variables are defined in Table A1 in the Appendix. Standard errors are reported in parentheses are clustered at the firm and 
bank level. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 
I II III IV V VI
Collateral Maturity Loan Spread Collateral Maturity Loan Spread
Treated -0.116 0.008 0.716*** -0.120 -0.045 0.681***
(0.078) (0.088) (0.172) (0.073) (0.096) (0.169)
Treated×After 0.275** -0.476*** -0.181 0.256** -0.377*** -0.097
(0.118) (0.071) (0.259) (0.128) (0.090) (0.264)
After -0.005 -0.190** 0.848***
(0.057) (0.081) (0.262)
Firm Characteristics
Rating 2 0.053 -0.055 -0.408 0.054 -0.069 -0.366
(0.041) (0.125) (0.345) (0.042) (0.123) (0.328)
Ratings 3 & 4 0.186* 0.073 -0.136 0.155 0.073 -0.078
(0.112) (0.232) (0.281) (0.119) (0.216) (0.225)
Relationship Characteristics
Rel Duration 0.010 -0.387*** 0.342*** -0.011 -0.438*** 0.285***
(0.015) (0.082) (0.039) (0.023) (0.093) (0.055)
Rel Duration-Square 0.118*** -0.074 0.154*** -0.060
(0.029) (0.050) (0.028) (0.043)
Rel Scope -0.029 0.074* -0.134 -0.004 0.037 -0.165
(0.033) (0.044) (0.202) (0.034) (0.047) (0.213)
Primary Bank -0.077 -0.085 0.057 -0.079 -0.085 0.043
(0.076) (0.097) (0.133) (0.074) (0.099) (0.141)
Bank Characteristics
Global Bank Size -0.223*** 0.081 0.334** -0.217*** 0.074 0.358**
(0.035) (0.074) (0.131) (0.036) (0.066) (0.143)
Market Share 0.301 0.205 0.397 0.287 0.176 0.234
(0.243) (0.208) (0.402) (0.204) (0.158) (0.482)
Cost of Deposits -0.008 0.077** 0.319*** -0.008 0.066** 0.310***
(0.015) (0.030) (0.066) (0.015) (0.029) (0.058)
Constant 1.576*** 1.945*** 11.116*** 1.510*** 2.133*** 11.092***
(0.188) (0.535) (1.038) (0.193) (0.495) (1.043)
Fixed Effects
Firm Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included Included Included
Year Fixed Effects Included Included Included
R-squared 0.293 0.238 0.683 0.304 0.251 0.689
Observations 1,103 1,103 1,103 1,103 1,103 1,103
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Table 6: Matching of Contract Terms 
The table reports results from a matching exercise using our sample of 5,137 loans to 287 firms that received a new loan 
from at least one foreign and one domestic bank in the same month during the period March 1999 to December 2003. For 
each specification, we estimate the average differences between the contract terms of domestic and foreign bank loans using 
the sub-sample of loans that satisfy the matching criteria in each case. In Column I, we match on firm identity and the month 
of loan origination. In Column II, we additionally match on ratings and relationship characteristics. In Column III, we also 
match on other contract terms as in Tables 3 and 4. For each matched sample, we report results for collateral, maturity, and 
loan spread. For the collateral regression, the dependent variable equals the difference in Collateral between the matched 
foreign and domestic bank loans. The dependent variables for the maturity and loan spread regressions are calculated 
similarly using Maturity and Loan Spread (see Table A1 in the Appendix for detailed definitions of Collateral, Maturity, 
and Loan Spread as well all other matching variables). For each dependent variable and sample, we estimate an OLS 
regression with only a constant term, clustering standard errors at the firm level. For each specification, we report the 
estimated constant term, the standard error, and the number of observations. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10%, respectively.  
Collateral Difference 0.303 *** 0.322 *** 0.424 ***
(0.008) (0.020) (0.030)
5,077      798 368
Maturity Difference -0.196 *** -0.177 *** -0.122 ***
(0.015) (0.030) (0.032)
5,077      798 368
Loan Spread Difference -0.834 *** -1.230 *** -1.369 ***
(0.039) (0.030) (0.132)
5,077      798 368
Matching Variables
Firm Identity Yes Yes Yes
Month of Loan Origination Yes Yes Yes
Firm Ratings Yes Yes
Relationship Duration Yes Yes
Scope Yes Yes
Primary Yes Yes
Installment Yes
Loan Amount Yes
III III
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Table 7: Joint Determination of Contract Terms 
The table reports estimation results for a sample of 5,137 loans to 287 firms that received a new loan from at least one 
foreign and one domestic bank in the same month during the period March 1999 to December 2003. Collateral is a dummy 
variable indicating whether the loan contract includes the pledge of collateral. Maturity is the natural logarithm of one plus 
the number of months between loan origination and maturity and Loan Spread is the loan interest rate minus the rate on US 
Treasury securities of comparable maturity at loan origination. Following Bharath, et al. (2011), we allow contract terms to 
be jointly determined in an IV framework. In particular, we use a dummy for industries with fewer tangible assets as an 
instrument for collateral, a dummy for regulated industries for maturity, and the average loan spread of all banks over the 
previous six months for loan spreads. Columns (a) report benchmark estimates similar to Tables 3 and 4, in columns (b) we 
add the instruments of the dependent variable, in column (c) we report estimates of the second-stage regression where the 
endogenous contract terms are instrumented by the respective instruments and in column (d) we use an indicator variable for 
sole proprietorship as an additional instrument for collateral as in Belluci, et al. (2015) and the term spread as an additional 
instrument for maturity as in Bharath, et al. (2010). Notice that we do not include firm×time fixed effects since the 
instruments do not vary in a given month within a firm. To assess whether the instruments are relevant, we report the Cragg-
Donald test statistics and the relevant critical values based on Stock and Yogo (2005) as well as the Kleibergen-Paap rk LM 
statistics. To test the validity and relevance of the instruments, we report Hansen’s J-statistic for overidentifying restrictions. 
All other variables are defined in Table A1 in the Appendix. Standard errors are reported in parentheses are clustered at the 
firm level. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
Probit Probit IV Probit OLS OLS IV OLS IV OLS OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS
I (a) I (b) I (c) II (a) II (b) III (c) IV (d) II (a) II (b) III (c) IV (d)
Foreign Bank 0.861*** 0.864*** 0.771*** -0.302*** -0.301*** -0.400** -0.204** -1.199*** -1.158*** -0.225 -0.574
(0.113) (0.113) (0.207) (0.034) (0.034) (0.157) (0.087) (0.153) (0.153) (0.580) (0.378)
Maturity 0.164* 0.154* 1.611*** -1.284*** -1.270*** 0.094 0.303
(0.089) (0.088) (0.197) (0.122) (0.119) (0.508) (0.358)
Collateral 0.108** 0.102* 0.460 -0.253 -0.246 -0.321* -2.412 -0.985
(0.052) (0.053) (0.536) (0.295) (0.187) (0.175) (2.264) (1.304)
Intangible Industry -0.513** -0.058
(0.222) (0.270)
Regulated Industry -0.122* -0.032 -0.207**
(0.074) (0.145) (0.097)
Term Spread -0.010
(0.024)
Past Regional Loan Spread 0.619*** 0.770*** 0.685***
(0.120) (0.213) (0.166)
Other Controls Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
Weak Identification Statistics
Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistic 31.398 38.644 40.469 43.52
Stock & Yogo critical value 16.38 19.93 16.89 16.87
Underidentification Test
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic 4.657 7.351 5.221 17.252
p-value (0.031) (0.025) (0.022) (0.001)
Instrument Exogeneity Tests
Hansen's J statistic 2.301 1.139
p-value (0.129) (0.566)
Collateral Maturity Spread
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Table 8: Bank Ownership and Loan Pricing 
The table reports OLS regressions for a sample of 5,137 loans to 287 firms that received a new loan from at least one foreign and one domestic bank in the same month during the period March 1999 
to December 2003. The dependent variable is Loan Spread, the loan interest rate minus the rate on US Treasury securities of comparable maturity at loan origination. Columns I-III report regression 
results with all control variables, where each variable is interacted with the Foreign Bank dummy. The Column Domestic reports the domestic bank coefficients, × Foreign reports the interaction 
coefficients, and Cumulative reports the foreign bank coefficients. Columns IV-VI and VII-IX report the same regression results, where the sample is divided between firms with outstanding bank 
debt below or above the sample median, denoted as Smaller Firms and Larger Firms, respectively. The definitions of all variables can be found in Table A1 in the Appendix. Standard errors 
(presented in parentheses) are clustered at firm level. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX
Domestic × Foreign Cumulative Domestic × Foreign Cumulative Domestic × Foreign Cumulative
Borrower Characteristics
Rating 2 0.168 0.478 0.646*** 0.334 -0.183 0.150 0.164 0.613 0.776***
(0.480) (0.534) (0.240) (0.913) (1.095) (0.599) (0.483) (0.550) (0.270)
Ratings 3 & 4 -0.900 2.097** 1.197** -2.518 3.440 0.922 -0.401 1.883*  1.482**
(0.896) (1.052) (0.583) (1.875) (2.190) (1.200) (0.870) (1.103) (0.638)
Relationship Characteristics
Rel Duration 0.299 -0.146 0.152 1.570** -0.618 0.952 -0.323 0.172 -0.151
(0.350) (0.516) (0.380) (0.717) (0.789) (0.745) (0.369) (0.572) (0.428)
Rel Duration-Square -0.091 0.052 -0.039 -0.381** 0.127 -0.254 0.042 -0.008 0.035
(0.093) (0.113) (0.081) (0.187) (0.175) (0.179) (0.099) (0.125) (0.091)
Rel Scope -0.249 0.800*** 0.551** -0.155 1.107 0.952* -0.261 0.763** 0.502*
(0.192) (0.277) (0.238) (0.495) (0.681) (0.498) (0.199) (0.299) (0.260)
Primary Bank -0.758*** 0.840** 0.082 -0.895** 0.631 -0.264 -0.548** 0.753*  0.205
(0.229) (0.374) (0.234) (0.396) (0.749) (0.484) (0.269) (0.405) (0.262)
Other  Contract Terms
Installment 0.610** -0.150 0.460** 0.206 0.176 0.382 0.698** -0.263 0.435*
(0.281) (0.390) (0.210) (0.507) (0.654) (0.447) (0.320) (0.436) (0.221)
Loan Amount -0.046 0.112 0.066 0.175 -0.109 0.066 -0.129 0.236** 0.106
(0.126) (0.094) (0.088) (0.124) (0.211) (0.189) (0.146) (0.114) (0.090)
Collateral -0.127 -0.302 -0.429** 0.076 -0.310 -0.234 -0.121 -0.347 -0.468**
(0.257) (0.296) (0.172) (0.500) (0.749) (0.407) (0.286) (0.326) (0.191)
Maturity -1.170*** -0.018 -1.188*** -1.254*** 0.132 -1.122*** -1.134*** -0.074 -1.209***
(0.194) (0.251) (0.158) (0.287) (0.437) (0.284) (0.222) (0.292) (0.189)
Constant 12.531*** -2.713** 9.818*** 10.584*** 0.065 10.649*** 13.657*** -4.452*** 9.205***
(1.195) (1.159) (1.023) (1.416) (2.390) (2.286) (1.419) (1.351) (1.025)
Fixed Effects
Borrower×Time Fixed Effect
R-squared 0.738 0.744 0.727
Observations 5,137 1,129 4,008
Included IncludedIncluded
All Firms Smaller Firms Larger Firms
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Table 9: Hard Information Determinants of Loan Interest Rates  
The table reports OLS regressions for a sample of 5,137 loans to 287 firms that received a new loan from at least one 
foreign and one domestic bank in the same month during the period March 1999 to December 2003. In all specifications, 
the dependent variable is the Loan Spread, the loan interest rate minus the rate on US Treasury securities of comparable 
maturity at loan origination that is regressed on credit ratings and past performance measures. Columns I-II report 
regression results for foreign and domestic banks separately, while Columns III-VI additionally split these two 
specifications between firms with outstanding bank debt below or above the sample median for foreign and domestic banks, 
denoted as Smaller Firms and Larger Firms, respectively. The definitions of all variables can be found in Table A1 in the 
Appendix. Standard errors (presented in parentheses) are clustered at firm level. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
I II III IV V VI
Foreign Domestic Foreign Domestic Foreign Domestic
Rating 2 1.563*** 0.633** 1.052*** 0.589 1.769*** 0.760**
(0.321) (0.291) (0.368) (0.535) (0.362) (0.313)
Ratings 3 & 4 3.579*** 1.038 1.220** -1.999** 4.123*** 1.934***
(0.872) (0.709) (0.613) (1.006) (1.012) (0.705)
Collateral -0.514* -0.757*** 0.310 -0.422 -0.732** -0.727***
(0.290) (0.254) (0.343) (0.592) (0.335) (0.276)
Constant 8.652*** 9.646*** 9.580*** 10.656*** 8.379*** 9.313***
(0.186) (0.171) (0.266) (0.226) (0.224) (0.186)
R-squared 0.104 0.019 0.030 0.017 0.155 0.027
Observations 2,679 2,458 565 564 2,114 1,894
Larger FirmsSmaller Firms
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Table 10: What Drives Distance-Related Information Constraints? 
Columns I-III report modified specifications of the Collateral, Maturity, and Loan Spread models. Panel A distinguishes 
foreign banks into foreign branches and foreign subsidiaries using specifications equivalent to those reported in columns III 
and VII of Table 3 and column III of Table 4 with Firm×Time Fixed Effects. The model is estimated with OLS using a 
sample of 689 loans to 30 firms that received a new loan from at least one domestic bank, one foreign branch and one 
foreign subsidiary in the same month during the period March 1999 to December 2003 (Restricted Sample). Panel B relaxes 
the constraint that firms must be borrowing from all three types of banks in the same month and considers a sample of firms 
borrowing from the three types of banks at any point during the sample period, resulting in a sample of 7,040 loans to 117 
firms (Larger Sample). The Firm×Time Fixed Effects are thus replaced with Firm and Time Fixed Effects. Panels C and D 
present specifications similar to Panel B allowing for interactions with Time Since Entry/Foreign Owned and Non-Local. 
The definitions of all variables are in Table A1 in the Appendix. Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered at firm level. 
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 
I II III
Collateral Maturity Loan Spread
A. Branches vs. Subsidiaries - Restricted Sample
Foreign Branch 0.422*** 0.103 -1.633***
(0.080) (0.101) (0.392)
Foreign Subsidiary 0.150* -0.226*** -1.371***
(0.086) (0.077) (0.297)
R-squared 0.466 0.509 0.706
Observations 689 689 689
T-test Branches vs. Subsidiaries (p-values) 0.018 0.022 0.457
B. Branches vs. Subsidiaries - Larger Sample
Foreign Branch 0.438*** -0.209*** -1.819***
(0.052) (0.044) (0.218)
Foreign Subsidiary 0.126*** -0.443*** -0.989***
(0.040) (0.059) (0.181)
R-squared 0.326 0.507 0.603
Observations 7,040 7,040 7,040
T-test Branches vs. Subsidiaries (p-values) 0.000 0.000 0.000
C. Time since Entry/Foreign Owned - Larger Sample
Foreign Branch 0.768*** -0.568*** -0.580
(0.106) (0.107) (0.507)
Foreign Subsidiary -0.147*** 0.035 -0.277
(0.052) (0.064) (0.297)
Foreign Branch×Time Since Entry -0.100*** 0.122*** -0.349**
(0.032) (0.031) (0.143)
Foreign Subsidiary×Time Since Foreign Owned 0.167*** -0.286*** -0.440***
(0.035) (0.041) (0.145)
R-squared 0.345 0.525 0.607
Observations 7,040 7,040 7,040
D. Geographical Distance - Larger Sample
Foreign Branch 0.444*** -0.159*** -1.503***
(0.054) (0.046) (0.263)
Foreign Subsidiary 0.143** -0.305*** -1.019***
(0.065) (0.076) (0.244)
Foreign Subsidiary×Non-Local -0.028 -0.232** 0.143
(0.081) (0.089) (0.337)
Non-Local -0.013 -0.039 -0.590**
(0.052) (0.055) (0.279)
R-squared 0.327 0.511 0.606
Observations 7,040 7,040 7,040
Foreign Subsidiary+Foreign Subsidiary×Non-Local 0.114** -0.537*** -0.876***
(0.049) (0.071) (0.253)
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Table 11: Bank Ownership and Ex Post Loan Performance 
The table reports OLS regressions on the ex post loan performance for a sample of 5,137 loans to 287 firms that received a new loan from at least one foreign and one domestic bank in 
the same month during the period March 1999 to December 2003. In each panel, we report specifications using different measures of ex post loan performance as a dependent variable. 
In Panel A, we use a dummy variable Arrears or Default that equals one if a loan is in arrears for more than 30 days or is downgraded to the default status (rating 5) and zero otherwise. 
In Panel B, we use the net return on loans as indicated by equation (3) minus each bank’s cost of deposit at loan origination. For each specification, we report the foreign bank 
coefficient, the constant term, the R-squared, and the number of observations. We estimate each model for all loans, for secured and unsecured loans separately, and for loans with 
maturities below and above the sample median. For Arrears or Defaults and Net Returns on Loans, we also estimate the model separately for secured and unsecured loans each with 
shorter and longer maturities including in all cases Firm×Time Fixed Effects. The definitions of all variables can be found in Table A1 in the Appendix. Standard errors (reported in 
parentheses) are clustered at firm level. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.  
 
A. Arrears or Default
Foreign Bank 0.035 ** 0.016 0.044 * 0.021 0.078 *** 0.030 0.016 0.034 0.077 *
(0.015) (0.025) (0.025) (0.015) (0.026) (0.030) (0.027) (0.029) (0.042)
Constant 0.048 *** 0.068 *** 0.041 *** 0.041 *** 0.044 *** 0.039 0.093 *** 0.032 ** 0.041 **
(0.008) (0.019) (0.010) (0.009) (0.012) (0.024) (0.017) (0.013) (0.017)
Firm×Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.554 0.781 0.632 0.665 0.707 0.799 0.887 0.736
Observations 5,137 1,698 3,439 2,705 2,432 1,005 693 1,700
B. Net Return on Loans 
Foreign Bank -1.260 *** -0.687 -1.731 *** -0.817 *** -1.685 *** 0.117 -1.168 * -1.396 *** -2.056 ***
(0.215) (0.500) (0.316) (0.252) (0.328) (0.837) (0.627) (0.416) (0.494)
Constant 11.197 *** 10.625 *** 11.470 *** 10.926 *** 11.416 *** 9.782 *** 11.221 *** 11.415 *** 11.512 ***
(0.112) (0.364) (0.132) (0.143) (0.153) (0.666) (0.394) (0.181) (0.198)
Firm×Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.650 0.851 0.710 0.804 0.732 0.919 0.904 0.832 0.789
Observations 5,102 1,693 3,409 2,686 2,416 1,000 693 1,686 1,723
0.772
1,739
All Loans Secured Unsecured Shorter Maturity Longer Maturity
Secured Unsecured
Shorter Maturity Longer Maturity Shorter Maturity Longer Maturity
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Table 12: Sample Selection and Competition Effects 
The table reports modified OLS regressions during the period March 1999 to December 2003. Panel A uses the “Universe” 
of 32,279 loans to 2,672 firms, Panel B a sample of 9,382 loans to 1,699 firms that have a single relationship with a foreign 
or domestic bank for the whole sample period. In Panels C to E, we split the main sample of 5,137 loans into 2,330 cases 
where the domestic bank was first, in 2,417 cases where the foreign bank was first, and in 390 cases where the foreign and 
domestic banks granted the loans on exactly the same day. Columns I-III report specifications equivalent to those reported in 
Columns III and VII of Table 3 and Column III of Table 4. In Panels A to B, we use firm and time fixed effect and 
firm×time fixed effects in Panels C to E. Collateral is a dummy variable indicating whether the loan contract includes the 
pledge of collateral. Maturity is the natural logarithm of one plus the number of months between loan origination and 
maturity and Loan Spread is the loan interest rate minus the rate on US Treasury securities of comparable maturity at loan 
origination. Standard errors (presented in parentheses) are clustered at firm level. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
I II III
Collateral Maturity Loan Spread
A. Universe
Foreign Bank 0.232*** -0.311*** -1.056***
(0.028) (0.030) (0.100)
Fixed Effects
Firm Fixed Effects Included Included Included
Time Fixed Effects Included Included Included
R-squared 0.469 0.658 0.694
Observations 32279 32279 32279
B. Single Relationship Firms
Foreign Bank 0.181** -0.349*** -0.308
(0.083) (0.124) (0.507)
Fixed Effects
Firm Fixed Effects Included Included Included
Time Fixed Effects Included Included Included
R-squared 0.723 0.805 0.784
Observations 9,382 9,382 9,382
C. Foreign Bank First
Foreign Bank 0.308*** -0.287*** -1.386***
(0.048) (0.052) (0.194)
Fixed Effects
Firm×Time Fixed Effects Included Included Included
R-squared 0.565 0.613 0.737
Observations 2,417           2,417           2,417           
D. Domestic Bank First
Foreign Bank 0.307*** -0.352*** -0.713***
(0.047) (0.050) (0.178)
Fixed Effects
Firm×Time Fixed Effects Included Included Included
R-squared 0.538 0.671 0.719
Observations 2,330           2,330           2,330           
E. Same Day
Foreign Bank 0.240*** -0.430*** -1.131***
(0.079) (0.122) (0.413)
Fixed Effects
Firm×Time Fixed Effects Included Included Included
R-squared 0.594 0.676 0.779
Observations 390              390              390              
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Table 13: Contract Terms, Bank Ownership, and Bank Size 
The table reports OLS regressions for a sample of 5,134 loans to 287 firms that received a new loan from at least one foreign and 
one domestic bank in the same month during the period March 1999 to December 2003. The sample size is smaller than in the 
benchmark regressions as bank size is not observed for all banks. Global Bank Size equals the natural logarithm of the originating 
bank’s total assets globally. Local Bank Size equals the natural logarithm of the originating bank’s total assets in Bolivia. 
Columns I-III report augmented specifications of the Collateral, Maturity, and Loan Spreads models with all control variables 
where we add Global Bank Size among the bank characteristics and in columns IV-VI we add Local Bank Size. Collateral is a 
dummy variable indicating whether the loan contract includes the pledge of collateral. Maturity is the natural logarithm of one 
plus the number of months between loan origination and maturity and Loan Spread is the loan interest rate minus the rate on US 
Treasury securities of comparable maturity at loan origination. The definitions of all variables can be found in Table A1 in the 
Appendix. Standard errors (presented in parentheses) are clustered at firm level. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10%, respectively. 
I II III IV V VI
Collateral Maturity Loan Spread Collateral Maturity Loan Spread
Bank Characteristics
Foreign Bank 0.195*** -0.376*** -0.743*** 0.205*** -0.306*** -1.060***
(0.042) (0.053) (0.166) (0.035) (0.042) (0.150)
Global Bank Size 0.032** 0.043*** -0.129***
(0.013) (0.010) (0.041)
Local Bank Size -0.186*** -0.104*** 0.019
(0.016) (0.026) (0.088)
Firm Characteristics
Rating 2 0.157*** -0.001 0.434** 0.103** -0.043 0.513**
(0.057) (0.097) (0.217) (0.048) (0.098) (0.239)
Ratings 3 & 4 -0.145 -0.158 0.541 -0.128 -0.176 0.657
(0.096) (0.175) (0.519) (0.095) (0.175) (0.542)
Relationship Characteristics
Rel Duration -0.099*** -0.132 0.009 -0.064*** -0.162 0.119
(0.026) (0.119) (0.251) (0.024) (0.117) (0.243)
Rel Duration-Square 0.025 -0.011 0.039 -0.047
(0.031) (0.065) (0.031) (0.061)
Rel Scope -0.034 -0.085 0.036 0.012 -0.078 0.116
(0.040) (0.054) (0.158) (0.034) (0.059) (0.164)
Primary Bank -0.125*** 0.119*** -0.316** -0.068** 0.151*** -0.330**
(0.034) (0.044) (0.131) (0.032) (0.043) (0.144)
Other Contract Terms
Installment -0.015 0.891*** 0.360** -0.007 0.869*** 0.534***
(0.035) (0.070) (0.156) (0.036) (0.071) (0.151)
Loan Amount 0.030** 0.067*** -0.000 0.039*** 0.069*** 0.016
(0.012) (0.024) (0.100) (0.012) (0.025) (0.098)
Collateral -0.282* -0.357**
(0.150) (0.172)
Maturity -1.134*** -1.187***
(0.128) (0.134)
Constant -0.039 0.798** 12.776*** 1.106*** 1.670*** 11.669***
(0.173) (0.320) (0.995) (0.158) (0.346) (1.083)
Fixed Effects
Firm×Time Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included Included Included
R-squared 0.551 0.640 0.737 0.594 0.639 0.731
Observations 5,134 5,134 5,134 5,134 5,134 5,134
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Appendix 
Table A1: Definitions of Variables 
Variable Names Definitions
Loan Characteristics
Installment = 1 if an installment loan, and = 0 if a single payment loan.
Loan Amount loan amount at loan origination in US dollars.
Collateral = 1 if collateral was pledged at loan origination, and = 0 otherwise.
Maturity number of months between loan origination and maturity.
Interest Rate annual contractual interest rate at loan origination.
Loan Spread loan interest rate minus rate on Treasury Bills of comparable maturity.
Geographical Location = 1 if a loan has been issued in one of the 9 different regions of Bolivia or abroad, and = 0 otherwise: Chuquisaca, La Paz, Cochabamba, Oruro, Potosi, Tarija, 
Santa Cruz, Beni, Pando, USA, Argentina, Paraguay, Panama.
Legal Structure & Industry
Sole Proprietorship = 1 if the firms is a sole proprietorship, and = 0 otherwise.
General Partnership = 1 if the firm is a general partnership (i.e., all partners have unlimited liability and ownership is not transferable), and = 0 otherwise.
Limited Partnership = 1 if the firm is a limited partnership (i.e., some partners have limited liability and their ownership rights are transferable), and = 0 otherwise.
Joint Stock Company = 1 if the firm is a joint-stock company (i.e., all partners have unlimited liability and their ownership rights are transferable) and = 0 otherwise.
Limited Liability Company = 1 if the firm is a limited liability company (i.e., all partners have limited liability and transferable ownership rights) and = 0 otherwise.
Other = 1 if the firm is a public company, a municipality, or a cultural, sport, religious associations and = 0 otherwise.
Industry = 1 if the firm belongs to a specific industry, and = 0 otherwise. We have 18 different industries: Agriculture and cattle farming; Forestry and fishery; Extraction of 
oil and gas; minerals; Manufacturing; Electricity, gas, water; Construction; Wholesale and retail trade; Hotels and restaurants; Transport, storage and 
communications; Financial intermediation; Real estate activities; Public administration, defense and social security; Education; Communal and personal social 
services; Activities of households as employees of domestic personnel; Activities of extraterritorial organizations and bodies; Other Activities.
Bank Debt
Outstanding Debt total outstanding bank debt.
Credit Quality
Past Non-Performance = 1 if the firm had any repayment problems (default or delinquency) in the past 12 months, and = 0 otherwise.
Rating i = 1 if the firm's rating is i, where i = 1 (best),…, 4 (worst), and = 0 otherwise.
Relationship Characteristics
Multiple Relationships = 1 if the firm has outstanding loans from multiple banks, and = 0 otherwise.
Rel Duration duration of bank-firm relationship in months.
Rel Scope = 1 if the firm has additional products (e.g., credit cards, lines of credit, discount documents, mortgages) with the bank and = 0 otherwise.
Primary Bank = 1 if more than 50% of the firm's outstanding bank debt is originated by the bank, and = 0 otherwise.
Bank Characteristics
Foreign Bank = 1 if more than 50% of bank's ownership is foreign owned, = 0 otherwise.
Non-Local = 1 if the region of the loan origination is different from a bank's headquarters, and = 0 otherwise.
Time_Entry/Foreign Owned natural logarithm of the loan origination date minus the time since a foreign bank entry or the time since a domestic bank became foreign owned.
Cost of Deposits average interest rate on dollar denominated saving deposits in a given month.
Market Share a bank's total loans in the country to the total loans in the country per month.
Global Bank Size natural logarithm of average total assets globally.
Local Bank Size natural logarithm of average total assets in Bolivia.
Ex Post Loan Performance
Arrears or Default = 1 if a loan is in arrears for more than 30 days or is downgraded to default status (rating 5), and = 0 otherwise.
Net Return on Loans return on loans as indicated by equation (3) minus a bank's cost of deposit at loan origination.
 
